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Abstract 
This thesis looks to explain why Norway and Alberta differ in their choices of natural 
resource revenue allocation. Norway saves most revenues in a government owned fund 
abroad, while Alberta leaves more revenues to be handled by the market and spends 
government derived rents on running provincial costs. Both cases keep vast amounts of oil 
and gas, and production volumes of these resources are about equal for the two. Alberta 
and Norway also display similarities on several other independent variables, which makes a 
‘most similar case’ comparison suitable. The cases differ on the independent variables – 
political culture and political institutional structure. These two variables will be employed in 
an attempt to understand why policy outcomes differ so fundamentally in the two cases. 
The political culture of Alberta is described by the concept of western alienation that inherits 
distrust in government, and the right to free enterprise. The Norwegian political culture is 
described by the notion of egalitarian individualism where unity and equality are important 
features. The political institutional structure of Alberta is in this thesis understood by the 
notion of neo-pluralism. Here business interests are expected to hold an advantage over 
other interest groups in society. For Norway democratic corporatism is being employed as 
descriptive of the political institutional structure. Following the theories, empirics and 
history presented, this thesis shows that the explanatory variables of political culture and 
political institutional structure are important for understanding the differences in policy 
outcomes in Alberta and Norway. Resource curse and Dutch disease theory will be 
employed, together with empirical numbers, to show why, or in what degree, Alberta and 
Norway are susceptible to these phenomena. The research will show that Alberta is, 
however mildly, in a larger degree disposed to the effects of the resource curse and the 
Dutch disease, than Norway. The level of susceptibility is closely linked to the choice of fund 
saving or not, thus political culture and political institutional structure become pertinent in 
understanding the reason for the differences.       
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Background 
The idea for this thesis was born during a semester abroad at the University of Alberta in 
Alberta, Canada. Alberta is one of ten provinces in Canada and is situated between British 
Columbia to the west and Saskatchewan to the east. Alberta is at the moment the most 
natural resource endowed province in Canada, and produces about the same amount of oil 
and gas as Norway every day. During my time in Alberta I discovered that the province is 
handling the rents derived from oil and gas production differently from what is seen in 
Norway. Alberta does like Norway keep a savings fund called the Alberta Heritage Savings 
Trust Fund, but stopped depositing revenue into it in 1987. Instead of saving the rents, the 
Alberta government spends almost all derived revenue on running provincial costs, and this 
policy runs contrary to the Norwegian solution of fund saving. It seems that Norwegian 
policymakers, with a few exceptions, agree on the decision of fund saving for future 
expenses. How may it be that the policies differ so fundamentally? The forthcoming thesis 
will look into this question. 
For the sake of simplicity the standard currency that will be utilized through the 
thesis is C$, Canadian dollars. Numbers concerning Norway directly will also be provided in 
NOK, Kroner. Please note that online references will be provided in footnotes and date of 
page loaded will be shown in parentheses. 
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“The right to any subsea deposit of oil and gas is vested in the state. This is 
crucial when you want to manage the resources to the benefit of the people1”    
- Ola Borten Moe, Norwegian Minister of Petroleum and Energy. 
 
“Our wealth and freedom depend on the individual right to free enterprise2”       
- Alison Redford, Alberta Premier. 
                                                 
1
 Vancouver Observer (03.0612): http://www.vancouverobserver.com/sustainability/2012/03/21/good-idea-
2
 Government of Alberta (03.06.12): http://alberta.ca/premieraddress.cfm  
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1 Introduction 
Guided by Premier3 Peter Lougheed (Progressive Conservatives, PC) the Alberta Heritage 
Savings Trust Fund (AHSF) was created in 1976 by the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust fund 
Act. The decision was made that 30 percent of Alberta’s non-renewable resource royalties 
were to be saved in the fund each year and from 1976 to 1987 revenues were added to the 
fund. The AHSF is an oil and gas revenue savings fund meant to provide the province with 
financial stability from fluctuating oil and gas prices and savings for future generations, and 
stands today at C$15.4 billion4. In 1987, when Don Getty (PC) was Premier of the province, 
royalties were no longer added to the fund due to economic downturn. Instead the money, 
generated from royalties and taxes from the oil and gas industry, was used continuously to 
pay for the running costs of provincial health care, education, infrastructure and paying 
down of provincial debt5. As a result of this Alberta could afford, and chose to, put an end to 
capital tax, payroll tax, and sales tax6. For example Alberta citizens pay 8.5 percent less sales 
tax than the Canadian average, and are still able to maintain a high level of public welfare 
due to the spending of oil and gas revenues. Despite of the halt in further additions to AHSF 
in the late eighties, the province established a new savings fund in 2003. The new fund is 
named the Sustainability Fund, and is used to help offset years in which energy revenues are 
below budget due primarily to changes in commodity prices, such as the price of oil and gas7. 
Between 2003 and 2008 roughly half of Alberta’s non-renewable resource revenues were 
stored in the Sustainability fund. Yet, since 2008 no further revenue has been added due to 
economic downturn8. 
In contrast, the Norwegian Petroleum Fund was established only four years after the 
halt of flow of capital into AHSF. In 1991, Norway inaugurated the Petroleum Fund and 
decided that net cash flow from oil production should be stored in the fund (Shiell and Busby 
                                                 
3
 The Premier is the head of government in Alberta (16.02.12): http://alberta.ca/aboutgovernment.cfm  
4
 Government of Alberta (22.02.12): http://www.finance.alberta.ca/business/ahstf/index.html 
5
 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (05.01.12): 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/realitycheck/sheppard/20060324.html 
6
 Alberta Economic Spotlight (17.02.12): http://www.finance.alberta.ca/aboutalberta/spotlights/2011-0708-
importance-of-oil-and-gas-investment-in-Alberta.pdf 
7
 University of Alberta (02.07.12): 
http://www.business.ualberta.ca/Centres/CABREE/Energy/~/media/business/Centres/CABREE/Documents/En
ergy/Oil/ZapisockySustainabilityFundBUEC.ashx  
8
 Alberta Fiscal Plan (02.07.12): http://www.finance.alberta.ca/publications/budget/budget2012/fiscal-plan-
overview.pdf 
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2008). However it was not until 1996 that money from oil and gas production was added to 
the fund. Revenue is preferably taken from the fund only for correctional purposes of 
deficits related to the production of oil and gas, and in 2001 a budgetary rule was 
established stating that ideally only 4 percent of net surplus is to be withdrawn from the 
fund each year to be used on running state costs9. In 2006 the fund changed its name to the 
Government Pension Fund of Norway. The main purpose of the Petroleum Fund, founded in 
1991, was to counter the economic effects of the inevitable future decline in income from oil 
production, to smooth out the disrupting effects of highly volatile oil prices, and to save 
some of the wealth for future generations10. Today, and as the present name implies, the 
savings are primarily meant to pay for future pension expenses. This will help mitigate the 
tax burden on taxpayers with an expected increase of retirees in the coming years. Keeping a 
division between the general economy and the oil economy also diminishes the risk of 
overheating the economy, and as mentioned above, the fund functions as a safeguard 
against volatile oil prices. The solution of severing the national economy in two, keeping oil 
revenue apart from the general economy, has broad acceptance among Norwegian 
politicians and parties. The Progress Party carries the only ongoing argument in the 
Norwegian political landscape for increasing the spending of oil revenue above the 4 percent 
budgetary rule11. Yet in Alberta the provincial politicians have opted for a solution of “spend 
it all”, running contrary to the Norwegian solution of fund saving.  
The dependent variable for the research is the allocation of natural resource revenue. 
Alberta and Norway have chosen different paths concerning where they allocate the capital 
coming from production of oil and gas. As mentioned above, Norway leaves most of the 
revenue in a fund invested abroad, whilst Alberta spends it on running provincial costs, such 
as education, health care, and tax breaks. The Alberta solution breaches fundamentally with 
the Norwegian solution of keeping the two economies severed, to protect national industry, 
as a safeguard against volatile oil prices, and saving for future generations. On the other 
hand, the Norwegian solution breaches fundamentally with the Alberta solution of keeping 
                                                 
9
 Government of Norway (14.04.12): 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fin/tema/norsk_okonomi/norsk_okonomi/informasjon-om-
handlingsregelen-.html?id=416335 
10
 Bank of Norway (15.04.12): http://www.nbim.no/en/About-us/Government-Pension-Fund-Global/ 
11
 Progress Party’s official webpage: http://www.frp.no/Vil+ha+ny+handlingsregel.d25-TMBHG1V.ips See also 
adressa.no (17.04.12): http://www.adressa.no/nyheter/innenriks/article1809991.ece 
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taxes low to encourage investment and consumption. Both models make sense economically 
in their own way, and the one may not be better than the other. Proof of this is seen in some 
of the most important independent variables that form the basis of the comparison. Alberta 
and Norway display close numbers in terms of employment, inflation (CPI), and GDP growth. 
Both cases perform well on these important economic factors. Yet they have chosen 
different paths concerning how to allocate revenue coming from natural resource 
production.    
This thesis will look at the two models and compare them up against each other. This 
is important because it can provide better insight into possible and necessary changes that 
can be made to both models. The main purpose of the thesis is to give an overview of why 
the experiences differ in Alberta and Norway concerning where resource revenue is 
allocated. The different approaches taken by Alberta and Norway toward the allocation of oil 
and gas money will be examined along two dimensions: 1) political environment and 2) the 
macroeconomic consequences of the two models. The first dimension includes political 
culture and political institutional structure. These two variables are related, as will be shown, 
although they are in two different domains (Easton 1990: 35). Together they form a 
dimension, which in this thesis is defined as the political environment. The research question 
that will be answered along the first dimension is: 
Why have the government of Norway and the provincial government of Alberta ended up 
with different policies for natural resource revenue allocation? 
The second dimension is applied to provide an economic rationale to the analysis. Resource 
curse and Dutch disease theory form the theoretical background for the analysis of the 
macroeconomic consequences of the two models. Resource curse is related to unfavorable 
rent seeking on behalf of government and other economic actors. Dutch disease points to 
negative economic effects of factor movement and excessive revenue spending due to the 
availability of large natural resource revenues. The research question that will be answered 
along the second dimension of macroeconomic consequences is:  
Why, or in what degree, are Alberta and Norway susceptible the resource curse and the 
Dutch disease? 
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2 Outline of the Thesis 
In the beginning chapters the methodology and variables that will be employed in the thesis 
will be presented. In the chapters called Case Description, one for each case, pertinent 
features related to the analysis of Alberta and Norway will be presented. The chapter 7 
Jurisdictional Autonomy makes a brief argument about similarities between the two cases on 
the matter of jurisdictional autonomy, to show that Alberta and Norway are relatively 
comparable, not only on the presented independent variables, but also in this regard. In 8 
Political Culture the political cultures of the two cases will be presented along with an 
analysis of the differences’ effect on the dependent variable. In the chapter 9 Political 
Institutional Structure democratic corporatism and neo-pluralism will be presented along 
with the argument that these two structures lead to opposing outcomes on the dependent 
variable. Resource curse theory and Hall and Soskice’s Varieties of Capitalism will be 
integrated in this chapter. The argument is that Alberta, with its pluralist structure, is more 
liable to the research curse than Norway, yet the Varieties of Capitalism approach shows 
that the economic policies of Alberta and Norway are rational if the aim is to maximize 
economic growth. Yet the chapter on the 10 Dutch Disease provides a picture of Norway as 
more successful than Alberta in avoiding this phenomenon.   
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3 Methodology 
The thesis will employ a comparative method and will build on George and Bennett’s (2005) 
method of structured, focused comparison. This implies a standardized collection of data 
that will be guided by general questions about the research objective, and enables a 
structured comparison of the two cases at hand - Alberta and Norway. George and Bennett 
(2005: 69) define three requirements for case study research: 1) the research universe must 
be clearly identified, 2) the research objective must be well defined, and 3) variables of 
theoretical interest for purposes of explanation must be employed.  
The universe of the research is the two cases Alberta, which is a province in Canada, 
and Norway, a sovereign country in northwestern Europe. It is important to note that the 
differences in terms of sovereignty may have implications on the analysis, thus case 
stretching could be a problem. Case stretching may occur when cases are defined too 
broadly to adequately fit the research design. Lijphart (1975: 172) notes that small-N studies 
are less prone to the dangers of case stretching because they provide possibilities to be 
more thorough, and thereby make sure that concepts, or cases, are not stretched. The 
jurisdictional differences between Canadian provinces and sovereign states will be 
accounted for to explain why the differences will have little effect on the main analysis of 
political culture and political institutional structure, and thereby avoid case stretching. 
Pertinent similarities and differences will be accounted for in thorough case studies.  
The cases differ, most notably, on the dependent variable, which is the allocation of 
natural resource revenue where Norway has opted for fund saving while Alberta has not. As 
mentioned, the cases also differ on two related independent variables: political culture and 
political institutional structure. Together these two variables form what here will be called 
the jurisdictions’ political environment. This dimension, the political environment, will be 
employed to explain the differences in policy outcome (dependent variable) in the two 
cases. The second dimension is the macroeconomic consequences of the two models. 
Resource curse and Dutch disease theory will be employed to investigate why, or in what 
degree, the two cases are susceptible to these two phenomena. The analysis will show that 
the level of resource curse and Dutch disease displayed in Alberta and Norway is linked with 
the degree of fund saving seen in the two jurisdictions. Thus, the political environment 
becomes pertinent in understanding the level of susceptibility the two cases show toward 
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the resource curse and the Dutch disease, following this thesis argument that the political 
environment affects the allocation of oil and gas revenue.  
3.1 Comparative Method   
Kohli (1995) writes, “comparative politics is very much a problem-driven field of study”. The 
task, or the “problem”, of this paper is the differences in policy options seen in Alberta, 
Canada and Norway. In turn this means that the study has been selected, and thereby relies, 
on the dependent variable. The technique of choosing study objects on the dependent 
variable involves detecting a puzzle in outcomes and then determining what characteristics 
the cases have in common (Dion 1998). Dion (1998) notes that inferences drawn from cases 
selected on the dependent variable are suspect, and especially in large-N studies, because 
estimates will be biased. Nevertheless he contends that small-N analyses of cases selected 
on the dependent variable are perfectly acceptable. Following this, choosing the research 
question on differences seen on the dependent variable in Alberta and Norway is admissible.  
A ‘most similar case’ comparison is suitable for the undertaking of the research as the 
two cases display similar numbers on important independent variables, as shown below. The 
‘most similar case’ method focuses on, as the name implies, cases that are similar e.g. 
developed western democracies as Alberta and Norway. To mitigate the problem of ‘many 
variables, small-N’ Lijphart (1975) suggests that “focusing the analysis on comparable cases 
(i.e., cases that are similar in large number of important characteristics, but dissimilar with 
regard to the variables between which a relationship is hypothesized), which may be found 
within a geographical-cultural area…”, is preferable. Accordingly the thesis will, in 
accordance with Lijphart (1975) and George and Bennett (2005: 50), compare two cases that 
are similar on pertinent independent variables but differ on the dependent variable. What is 
clear by now is that the goal of the exercise is to discover why the two cases display different 
outcomes on the dependent variable with the appearance of a multitude of similar 
independent variables, and this, Castles (1982) contends, makes the approach of the ‘most 
similar case’ well suited for the task.  
There are advantages and disadvantages to the use of comparative method. Mill’s 
(1843/1970: bk. 6, ch. 7) objection to the use of the method of difference is that sufficiently 
similar cases cannot be found. Przeworski and Teune (1970: 34) contend that the number of 
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similarities between countries is finite; however “it will almost invariably be sufficiently large 
to ‘overdetermine’ the dependent phenomenon…” There is necessarily more than one factor 
that ranks Alberta and Norway in the same order, and George and Bennett (2005: 51) note 
that the omission of pertinent variables may entirely invalidate the research findings. 
Lijphart (1975), however, claims that this problem can be alleviated by the imaginative 
selection of other cases, and according to George and Bennett (2005: 254) inferences may 
not necessarily be invalidated by omitted variables. Yet the problem of overdetermination is 
a real one, and spurious variables may explain the outcome in the dependent variable. To 
mitigate the problem of overdetermination, thorough case studies highlighting important 
similarities and differences will be conducted on Alberta and Norway.  
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4 Variables 
4.1 Variable operationalization 
The independent variables that form the foundation for the comparison are hard numbers 
and this makes operationalization of the variables fairly straight forward; population, 
meaning that the tax bases are reasonably similar; resource ownership, meaning that both 
cases have ownership of their natural resources; unemployment, the jurisdictions display 
fairly similar numbers in terms of unemployment; oil and gas production, the total oil and 
gas production is somewhat similar leading to rather similar potential revenues from rents; 
consumer price index (CPI), meaning that inflation rates have been similar in the two 
jurisdiction over the last twenty years (1990-2010); GDP/cap and GDP/total, these numbers 
are similar in the two cases and both models generate substantial economic growth. Both 
cases display fairly similar numbers on all of these variables. The cases differ substantially on 
the independent variable: oil and gas rents. This variable is important because it says 
something about the level of rent that the authorities of the two jurisdictions claim and, 
hence, how much revenue that is available for eventual fund saving. The explanation of the 
differences seen on this variable, the level of rent, is however not the objective of the paper 
but where the rent is allocated. Differences in this variable will therefore not have severe 
implications on the analysis.  
Two related independent variables differ and these will explain the differences in 
policy outcome in Alberta and Norway. The two variables are: political culture described by 
the notion of western alienation in Alberta and by egalitarian individualism in Norway; and 
political institutional structure described by neo-pluralism in Alberta and by democratic 
corporatism in Norway. These concepts will be elaborated on in later chapters. 
Macroeconomic consequences are operationalized as the economic effects seen in the two 
cases in light of resource curse and Dutch disease theory. These concepts will also be 
explained in later chapters. The dependent variable is the allocation of natural resource 
revenue and is operationalized as where the government extracted oil and gas rents are 
allocated or spent. Further explanation on the dependent variable will be given below in 
chapter 4.3 Dependent Variable.  
10 
 
4.2 Independent Variables 
This section will give an overview, in numbers and words, of the independent variables that 
form the foundation for the comparison between Alberta and Norway. The numbers are 
fairly similar for the two cases and hence make them comparable. Please note that the 
numbers are taken from years varying between 2009 and 2012 due to availability.   
Table 1 
 
*1990 – 2010 average. 
** The two cases differ substantially on the oil rents/year variable. This will not have great implications on the 
analysis as the research question of this paper is where the rent is being allocated, and not the level of rent 
being captured by the two governments.   
 
References for Alberta numbers are found at: population (2011)12. GDP total13 (2011). 
GDP/cap (Canadian average is C$47 605)(2010)14. Unemployment rate (2011)15. Oil 
production (2011)16. Gas production (2011)17. Revenue from non-renewable resources 
(2011)18. Consumer price index (1990 to 2010 average)19. Ownership: The Constitution Act of 
                                                 
12
 Statistics Canada (15.02.12): http://www40.statcan.gc.ca/cbin/ze/w40re.cgi/l01/cst01/demo02a-eng.htm 
13
 Alberta Economic Quick Facts (15.02.12): http://www.albertacanada.com/documents/SP-
EH_AlbertaEconomicQuickFacts.pdf  
14
 Statistics Canada (15.02.12): http://www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sum-som/l01/cst01/econ15-eng.htm  
15
 Alberta Economic Quick Facts: http://www.albertacanada.com/documents/SP-
EH_AlbertaEconomicQuickFacts.pdf 
16
 ERCB Report 2011 (15.02.12): http://www.ercb.ca/docs/products/STs/st98_current.pdf 
17
 ERCB Report 2011 (15.02.12): http://www.ercb.ca/docs/products/STs/st98_current.pdf  
18
 Finance Alberta (17.02.12): http://www.finance.alberta.ca/publications/budget/budget2012/fiscal-plan-
revenue.pdf 
19
 Statistics Canada (15.02.12): http://www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sum-som/l01/cst01/econ150a-
eng.htm 
 Independent variables Alberta Norway
Similar:
Population: 3.7 million 5 million
Ownership natural resources: Yes Yes
Resource production/year/oil: 816 million barrels 766 million barrels
Resource production/year/gas: 111 billion scm. 106 billion scm.
Unemployment: 5.5% 3.2%
Consumer price index:* 2.65% 2.26%
GDP/total C$286.6 billion C$460 billion
GDP/cap: C$77 459 C$91 000
Resource rents/year:** C$8.4 billion C$49 billion
Different:
Political environment:
Political culture: Western alienation Egalitarian individualism
Political institutional structure: Neo-pluralism Democratic corporatism
11 
 
1867 states in section 92A that: “exploration, development, taxation and export to other 
provinces of non-renewable natural resources, forestry resources and electrical energy…” 
these are all powers exclusive to the provincial legislatures20. The explanatory variables 
political culture and political institutional structure will be commented on in Part 3 of the 
thesis. References for Norway numbers are found at: population (2012)21. GDP total 
(2011)22. GDP/cap (2011)23. Unemployment rate (2012)24. Oil production (2010)25. Gas 
production (2010)26. Revenue from non-renewable resources (2009)27. Consumer price index 
(1990 to 2010 average)28. Ownership: Norway has full ownership right to natural resources 
found in its jurisdiction cf. the principle of national sovereignty. The explanatory variables 
political culture and political institutional structure will be commented on in Part 3 of the 
thesis. 
Alberta and Norway display similar numbers on a range of variables. These variables 
show that the two jurisdictions have about the same potential for rent collection from the oil 
and gas industry, but they also show that Norway collects far larger rents than Alberta. 
Norway displays a lower unemployment rate than Alberta, yet Alberta’s rate of 5.5 percent 
is considerably lower than the Canadian average of 7.2 percent.  The numbers further show 
that both systems prove economically effective with stable inflation, and high GDP numbers.  
4.3 Dependent Variable 
This section will provide an overview of the political and economic considerations taken 
toward the eventual policy option concerning the allocation of natural resource revenue.   
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4.3.1 Alberta 
Until 1987 revenue from oil production was stored in the AHSF, however from that year on 
no revenue has been added to the fund. Alberta has used its natural resource wealth for 
continuing government business instead of fund-saving: building hospitals and schools, 
developing the incentives and infrastructure for a growing energy sector, keeping taxes low, 
and paying off its debt29. However, below is a statement by the government of Alberta that 
implies that there are uncertainties about today’s fiscal priorities concerning revenue 
coming from oil and gas: 
(…) Albertans understand that we can’t continue to rely on our energy revenue in the same ways that 
we have in the past. Budget 2012 signals that, in consultation with Albertans, this government will 
look at how savings are used, the appropriate use of borrowing for capital, and how to reduce reliance 
on resource revenues to ensure that we continue to have healthy savings. Since Alberta’s non-
renewable resource revenues represent income from a depleting public asset, it is essential that we 
become progressively less reliant on these revenues to fund ongoing programs. Over time, as our non-
renewable resource base is drawn down, Alberta’s non-renewable resource revenues will also enter a 
period of irreversible decline. This may be far in the future, but that day will eventually arrive.
30
 
The government signals that it will look at the way savings are used today, and further, to 
reduce the reliance on resource revenues in the future. The statement also acknowledges 
the fact that petroleum is a non-renewable resource that one day will be depleted. Even so, 
Alberta has yet to begin putting more money into the AHSF, and according to CBC News the 
Alberta government remains focused on cutting Alberta's deficit and have no official plans to 
save more in AHSF31.   
In 1998 the Alberta government surveyed Albertans about their fiscal priorities and 
the survey results showed that Albertans prioritized reduction of taxes, debt elimination, 
and increased spending in priority areas over increased savings in the AHSF32. In a 2002 
survey, ‘It’s your money’33, Albertans reiterated their wish for tax rebates over increased 
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 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (04.04.12): 
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saving. These survey results correspond well with the fiscal policies of the Albertan 
government, and provide them with a sort of public support. Others, though, have voiced 
concerns about the way oil and gas revenues are managed. Below is a statement from the 
Alberta Chambers of Commerce:   
(…) ACC continues to urge for more stringent and disciplined control of spending with a view to placing 
a more substantial portion of royalty revenues – not only surpluses – into savings. It may be that the 
most appropriate action will be restoration of the Stabilization Fund to substantial levels. Long term, it 
is clear that greater savings are required to both provide short-term stability and long-term 
substitution of the resource revenue stream.
34
 
Alberta Chambers of Commerce35, a business organization representing more than 23 000 
businesses, recommends that a greater portion of royalty revenues are saved, rather than 
spent. Their main arguments for increased savings are better short-term economic stability 
against volatile oil and gas prices, and long-term stability as oil is a non-renewable natural 
resource.  
Combined, the government statement, the survey results, and the concerns voiced 
by the ACC show that there are disagreements in Alberta, both inside and outside 
government walls, about today’s fiscal priorities of low fund savings. Nevertheless, as of 
today, the Alberta government does not save royalty and tax revenue coming from oil and 
gas production in the AHSF.    
4.3.2 Norway 
In Norway the Government Pension Fund Global is an integrated part of the Norwegian 
government’s annual budget. Its capital inflow consists of all government petroleum 
revenue, net financial transactions related to petroleum activities, net of what is spent to 
balance the state’s non-oil budget deficit36. In 2001 a budgetary rule was set to 4 percent 
mirroring the expected return from the fund: 
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The fiscal policy guidelines, in place since 2001, stipulate that fiscal policy shall be geared towards a 
gradual increase in the use of petroleum revenues. Over time, the structural non-oil central 
government budget deficit shall correspond to the expected real return, estimated at 4 per cent, on 
the Government Pension Fund - Global. The guidelines also allow fiscal policy to be used actively to 
counter fluctuations in economic activity (…) In a cyclical expansion, fiscal policy restraint relative to 
the spending rule is called for, whereas in a cyclical downturn higher spending of oil revenues is 
justified to stabilize the economy.
37
 
The 4 percent rule is a guideline that can be deviated from. In economic downturns the 
spending may exceed 4 percent to counter cyclical downturns. Hence Norwegian authorities 
have substantial freedom to dip into the fund if considered needed.  
When the Norwegian economy experienced relatively low capacity utilization at the start of the 
millennium, the structural, non-oil budget deficit was well above the 4 per cent path. During the 
cyclical boom between 2006 and 2008, spending of petroleum revenues was below the 4 per cent 
path. To counter the adverse effects on the Norwegian economy from the current financial crises, 
spending of petroleum revenues has in 2009 once again been brought well above the 4 per cent 
path.
38
 
The above statement from the Norwegian government demonstrates the room for financial 
maneuvering the fund provides for Norwegian policymakers. Without the restrictive features 
of the budgetary rule too much money could have been spent during the boom years 
between 2006 and 2008, with the probable result of unnecessary inflation. Throughout the 
financial downturn, however, the fund was utilized to counter the adverse effects the 
economy experienced.    
Although fiscal policy has an important role in dampening the impact of the international economic 
downturn on the Norwegian economy, it is important not to lose sight of the long term challenges 
resulting from an aging population. While the demographic structure in Norway has developed 
favorably in the last 20 years with respect to public finances, a projected increase in the share of 
elderly in the population will soon put an increasing pressure on public finances.
39
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In addition to being a buffer against external financial events, the fund will in the future be 
utilized as a source for pension payments. There is an expected increase of retirees in the 
coming years, and this will put increasing pressure on public finances. In 2006 the fund 
changed its name from the Petroleum Fund of Norway, to the Government Pension Fund 
Global. The primary purpose of the Government Pension Fund Global is to facilitate 
government savings necessary to meet the rapid rise in public pension expenditures in the 
coming years, and to support a long-term management of petroleum revenues40.  
The fiscal policy guidelines concerning petroleum revenues were presented by the 
Norwegian government in Report No. 29 (2000-2001)41 and received support by a large 
majority in parliament. The support for the report displayed in parliament underlines the 
resoluteness of Norwegian authorities, across the political spectrum, in shielding the 
economy from excessive petroleum revenue spending, and saving for future pension 
expenses. 
Contrary to the resilience of Norwegian policymakers on restricting the use of oil and 
gas revenue, the Norwegian voters seem to wish for a higher degree of spending, referring 
to public surveys. In 1997, 35 percent answered that today’s spending is on par, while 56 
percent felt that more oil and gas revenue should be used. In 2001 the numbers show 23 
percent in favor of restrictive spending, while the number has increased to 67 percent for 
the people who want increased spending. Four years later, in 2005, the numbers still show 
that increased spending is a public priority with 34 percent (restrictive) and 56 percent 
(increased spending) (Narud andAardal 2007: 187):  
Table 2 
 
Even though parliament displays broad support for today’s priorities it seems that the voters 
are in favor of larger spending of oil and gas revenue, than what is and has been spent. It is 
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 Government of Norway (25.05.12): http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selected-topics/the-government-
pension-fund.html?id=1441  
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year restricive use spend more
1997 35 % 56 %
2001 23 % 67 %
2005 34 % 56 %
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noteworthy that the numbers fluctuate with more than 10 percent, yet voters are 
apparently inclined to regularly allow a higher degree of spending.   
4.4 Summary 
This chapter has provided a brief background to the dependent variable: the allocation of 
natural resource revenue. The Alberta government admits that today’s low levels of fund 
savings are unsustainable over time as oil and gas are non-renewable resources, but has yet 
to establish renewed saving schemes to the AHSF. Norwegian policymakers, on the other 
hand, have developed vivid policies aimed at preserving the oil and gas revenue for future 
expenses and as a safeguard against volatile oil and gas prices. With regard to the citizens, 
public surveys show that people in both jurisdictions favor a high(er) degree of resource 
revenue spending.  
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5 Case Description: Norway 
Norway is a country in the northwest corner of Europe and has the jurisdictional autonomy 
of a sovereign country, unlike Alberta which is a province in Canada. Yet Norway and Alberta 
share similar features in terms of independence. Both have ownership of natural resources 
found on their territories, and both are responsible for health care, education, and 
infrastructure within their jurisdictions. This chapter will investigate features of Norway, as a 
sovereign European state, and look at aspects important for the analysis of why the country 
has opted to save resource revenue in a fund.    
5.1 The Unitary State  
The Norwegian constitution declares in article 1 that the state is indivisible: 
“(Article 1) The Kingdom of Norway is a free, independent, indivisible and inalienable Realm. Its form 
of government is a limited and hereditary monarchy.” 
Article 1’s historical background was the fear of being divided by Swedish or other foreign 
conquerors (Smith 2009: 178). Today this historical background is of limited interest, 
however article 1 states that Norway is a unitary state, unlike Canada, and this cannot 
change without an amendment to the constitution. Norway is regulated by one constitution 
centralized on one level. The centralization of power is fortified by article 3, article 49, and 
article 88 in the constitution (Smith 2009: 178): 
(Article 3) The Executive Power is vested in the King, or in the Queen if she has succeeded to the 
Crown pursuant to the provisions of Article 6 or Article 7 or Article 48 of this Constitution. When the 
Executive Power is thus vested in the Queen, she has all the rights and obligations which pursuant to 
this Constitution and the Law of the Land are possessed by the King. 
(Article 49) The people exercise the Legislative Power through the Storting. 
(Article 88) The Supreme Court pronounces judgment in the final instance. Nevertheless, limitations 
on the right to bring a case before the Supreme Court may be prescribed by law.  
Article 3 states that the executive power rests with the King, understood as with the 
government. Article 49 states that the legislative power is exercised by the people through 
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parliament – the Storting, and article 88 certifies that the Supreme Court pronounces 
judgment in the final instance. 
5.2 Monetary system 
Norway is a sovereign state with its own currency and independent central bank. Bank of 
Norway provides the currency and the primary interest rate, which means that the 
Norwegian government must take this into consideration when budgeting42. Too high public 
spending could force the central bank into raising the primary interest rate that again could 
prove damaging to Norwegian industry. An increasing primary interest rate could also inflate 
the national currency and hence hurt exports. The Norwegian government decided in 2001 
that the Bank should aim for a yearly inflation of 2.5 percent. This is to maintain steady price 
developments. The monetary policies of the Bank are also aimed at maintaining a stable 
exchange rate for the national currency (Opstad 2010: 295). The Bank’s most important tool 
is the primary interest rate. If the Bank raises the interest rate, the result may very well be 
an appreciating currency. This will lead to cheaper imports as the appreciating currency 
reduces the costs on imported goods. On the other hand, the strengthening of the currency 
will make exports more expensive. Domestic industry will be left weaker to competition 
from abroad, and production may decline and lead to lower demands for labor.  
Therefore Norwegian economic policies are aimed at keeping a stable inflation rate thus 
creating a steady production environment for Norwegian businesses. These realities have 
implications on the possibility of natural resource revenue spending.  
5.3 Political Economy 
According to the Norwegian government the operational implementation of Bank of 
Norway’s monetary policy shall be aimed at low and stable inflation, defined at a 2.5 percent 
increase in consumer price index (CPI) over time. The monetary policy shall contribute to 
stabilizing output and employment developments and steady exchange rate developments. 
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The long-term goal of monetary policy is to provide the economy with a nominal anchor. 
Over time, low and steady inflation is an important precondition for growth and welfare43. 
Monetary policy influences the economy with long and variable legs. Bank of Norway sets the interest 
rate with a view to stabilizing inflation at the target within a reasonable time horizon, normally 1-3 
years. The more precise horizon will depend on disturbances to which the economy is exposed and 
how they will affect the path for inflation and the real economy ahead.
44
 
The reason why it is important to control inflation is because its effects on the real economy 
and the politics of wealth distribution. In 1979 the Norwegian government inaugurated a 
long-term policy program to fight inflation. The high inflation seen in the seventies was 
unwanted and measures would be taken to keep it under control (Opstad 2010: 285), which 
the stated principles above show. 
Further, the Norwegian government states that monetary policy regulation shall aim 
for stability in the domestic and international value of the Norwegian krone45. The 
operational objective for monetary policy is low and steady inflation however no target has 
been defined for the level of Norwegian krone exchange rate. Although, according to the 
Norwegian Government the Norwegian krone exchange rate developments are of 
considerable importance when determining interest rates:  
For a small, open economy, there is a close relationship between exchange rate developments and 
domestic inflation. Exchange rate stability can contribute to expectations of continued low inflation, 
which in turn influence both wage and price setting. Stable economic developments, with moderate 
price and cost inflation, are also a precondition for stable exchange rate developments over time.
46 
As this report shows, the Norwegian government has to take both internal and external 
factors into consideration. Inflation and the currency will be affected by government 
spending, and these two factors must be kept under control. The difference between Alberta 
and Norway on this account is that Norway has the tools, the primary interest rate and its 
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own currency, to do something about it, while Alberta, being a province in a federation does 
not have that ability in the same degree.  
5.3.1 Oil Revenue Spending 
Østerud (2007) describes Norway as a deviant case among the European states in his 
chapter in Norway in Transition Transforming a Stable democracy, however according to 
Listhaug (2007: 130) Norway holds a favorable position compared to other European states. 
Norway has been a leading country on the UN Human Development Index (HDI) in resent 
reports. In addition to the successes in welfare and quality of life, Norway’s management of 
its oil and gas fortune has been favorably described by Karl (1997) in The Paradox of Plenty. 
According to Karl (1997: 213-220) the Norwegian success in handling its oil wealth can be 
attributed to economic diversification and a strong state capacity to handle the pressures 
and risks of oil booms. It is an important task for Norway to avoid the resource curse. Oil 
provides Norway with great financial strength, and there is constant pressure on the 
Government to spend this money to keep the welfare state running (Røed Larsen 2004). The 
state can no longer claim it does not have the money to reform status quo. On the other 
hand, there are limited possibilities for larger production in the Norwegian real economy 
(Vale 2007: 449). If the conditions in the health sector, education and so on are to be 
improved there is a need for a greater labor force. Due to demographic changes including a 
greater proportion of retirees and people living off social assistance, there will be a constant 
lack of labor in the coming years, according to Vale (2007: 449). If the use of oil money is 
increased too much under these conditions there is a possibility for excess demand in the 
markets for labor and goods. This will lead to increased wages and production costs, which 
will put pressure on prices (Vale 2007: 450). If these factors increase more domestically than 
abroad it could be damaging for the national economy as a whole, as the Dutch disease is a 
prime example of (see Corden and Neary 1982).  
Norway’s economy is small by international standards, and is therefore open and 
exposed to developments in international markets. Because of this, Norwegian governments 
have not been free to pursue the policies they most wanted due to external constraints 
(Heidar 2001: 95). Also, the oil prices fluctuate vastly in the international market and this 
makes the Norwegian economy vulnerable to price vagaries. The politics of oil has therefore 
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become central to the Norwegian decision-makers. Oil is a non-renewable resource and the 
earnings that it generates must be managed in a sound fashion. A starting point could be 
that the earnings do not belong solely to the generation that discovered the resources and 
hence revenue should be saved for generations to come (Shiell and Busby 2008). To 
maintain this goal only the return from the savings fund should be used as a budgetary rule. 
In Norway this budgetary rule is called ‘handlingsregelen’ and is currently set to 4 percent, 4 
percent is the estimated return the fund will yield.  
Alaska, as an example, decided that the oil revenue should be invested abroad. This 
way the dangers of the Dutch disease would be diminished. This is a rule also followed by 
Norway. The Pension Fund is solely invested abroad. Hence the name: The Government’s 
Pension Fund Global.  
5.3.2 Employment 
The main objectives of the Government’s economic policy are to contribute to high employment, 
sustainable development, fair distribution of income and well-functioning welfare schemes. This 
requires sound policies with emphasis on environmental challenges, long-term management of 
national wealth and the development of a strong and sustainable public sector. The various aspects of 
economic policy need to work together to reach these objectives. 
47
 
Today the petroleum industry accounts for roughly one third of exports. However, the share 
of total employment only accounts for about 1 percent. This means that the petroleum 
industry is more important in financial and foreign policy terms than in employment terms 
(Heidar 2001: 103). Krugman and Wells (2009) state that unemployment is one of the evils of 
macroeconomics, and in accordance with this, Norwegian governments have pursued a 
policy of full employment since 1945. In 1954 an amendment to the Norwegian constitution 
made it a public responsibility to create conditions for full employment (Heidar 2001: 107). It 
is a fact that the Norwegian level of unemployment has been very low compared to similar 
countries. In the period between 1945 and 1980 the numbers fluctuated amid 1.5 and 3 
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percent48. Since the seventies policies meant to alleviate unemployment have become more 
complex involving both micro- and macroeconomic measure (Heidar 2001: 108).  
5.4 The Rents 
This chapter will give a short introduction to the levels of rent captured by Norway. Primarily 
this paper does not look at the levels of rent captured by the jurisdiction, however the level 
of rent captured by the state acts as an important proxy for the general policy approach a 
state takes toward oil and gas development.  
In contrast to the Alberta approach, Norwegian policies have focused on securing 
high levels of rent. The start of the Norwegian oil era was marked by the discovery of the 
Ecofisk field on the Northern Continental Shelf in 1969 by the Phillips Company (Lind and 
Mackay 1980: 14). In 1971 the ‘Ten Oil Commandments’ were established as main policy 
guidelines for oil development in the North Continental Shelf:49  
1. National supervision and control must be ensured for all operations on the NCS. 
2. Petroleum discoveries must be exploited in a way which makes Norway as independent as possible of 
others for its supplies of crude oil. 
3. New industry will be developed on the basis of petroleum. 
4. The development of an oil industry must take necessary account of existing industrial activities and 
the protection of nature and the environment. 
5. Flaring of exploitable gas on the NCS must not be accepted except during brief periods of testing. 
6. Petroleum from the NCS must as a general rule be landed in Norway, except in those cases where 
socio-political considerations dictate a different solution. 
7. The state must become involved at all appropriate levels and contribute to a coordination of 
Norwegian interests in Norway’s petroleum industry as well as the creation of an integrated oil 
community which sets its sights both nationally and internationally. 
8. A state oil company will be established which can look after the government’s commercial interests 
and pursue appropriate collaboration with domestic and foreign oil interests. 
9. A pattern of activities must be selected north of the 62nd parallel which reflects the special socio-
political conditions prevailing in that part of the country. 
10. Large Norwegian petroleum discoveries could present new tasks for Norway’s foreign policy. 
 
The tax system is an important component of the fiscal policy framework for deriving rent 
from oil and gas activities. Originally the state participated directly in oil production through 
Statoil, however in 1985 state participation was reorganized with the creation of The State’s 
Direct Financial Interest (SDFI). The reorganization severed Statoil’s share of licenses in two, 
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leaving the other part to SDFI. The arrangement with the SDFI involves the state paying a 
share of investments and operating costs in projects, and later receiving a matching share of 
revenues from the sale of production50. Total dividends from Statoil and SDFI are major 
sources of income for the state, and in 2009 Norway’s total revenue from non-renewable 
resources was NOK279.8 billion (approximately C$49 billion)51.  
Figure 1 
 
Source: Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, found at: http://www.npd.no/en/Publications/Facts/Facts-
2012/Chapter-3/ 
Figure 2 shows the net government cash flow from petroleum activities since the seventies. 
Revenue has decreased the last couple of years, but is nevertheless substantially higher than 
the government extracted rents in Alberta. The Norwegian system of rent collection has 
eventually led to an investment fund of approximately C$630 billion52.  
5.5 Summary 
Norway, as opposed to Alberta, is a sovereign unitary state.  Policy measures must be taken 
concerning value of the currency, inflation, and employment. External events and pressures 
affect all the policies concerning these numbers. Still, Norway has managed well 
economically through several years and is regularly positioned in top spot of the United 
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Nations HDI. Regarding oil and gas revenue a government owned oil fund has been 
established receiving net revenue of dividends from production.    
25 
 
6 Case description: Alberta 
Alberta is a province in Canada. Through being a province in a federation it does not have 
the same jurisdictional autonomy as a sovereign state, like Norway. Yet the Canadian 
provinces have substantial independence e.g. they have ownership to natural resources 
found on their territories, and they are responsible for health care, education, and 
infrastructure. The provinces also have the possibility to loan money and hence establish 
debt. This chapter will investigate features of Alberta, as a Canadian province, and look at 
aspects important for the analysis of why the province has opted not to save resource 
revenues in a fund.    
6.1 Canadian Federalism 
In a federal system, as in Canada, the central government cannot abolish the provincial 
legislatures, and some legislative powers belong solely to the provinces within their 
jurisdictions. These powers are guaranteed by the division of powers in the constitution 
(Boase 1995: 152). Canada is a federation with two distinct levels of government: the federal 
government, which is countrywide, and the ten provincial governments. The provinces are 
linked together by the Canadian Crown, but the federal parliament and the provincial 
legislative assemblies are independent of each other with respect to legislative authority. 
This means that for example foreign affairs lie entirely with the federal government, while 
education and health care are part of the provincial jurisdictions (Banting and Simeon 1983). 
According to Jackson, Jackson and Baxter-Moore (1986: 190) a need for division between 
central and provincial powers in Canada became apparent in the nineteenth century. The 
vast distances of Canada combined with lack of transportation and communications among 
the provinces, meant that some independence had to be granted to local entities. The 
federal principle was accepted as a protection for provinces and language groups, even 
though Canada’s first Prime Minister John A. Macdonald preferred a unitary state. However, 
Yukon and Northwest Territories remain under legal control of the federal government. The 
third territory Nunavut is in the beginning stages of the process of governing themselves.      
Since the passage of the Constitution Act of 1867 Canada has had a federal system of 
government, which means that there are two levels of government that can legitimately 
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pass laws that affect Canadian citizens. The federal government can legislate for all 
Canadians in the ten provinces and three territories, and the provincial governments can 
pass laws that are binding to the citizens of that particular province. It is the Constitutional 
Act that sets out the constitutional division of powers, and the enumerated powers, which 
are primarily in section 91 and 92 of the act, are referred to as the “jurisdictions” of the two 
governments (Boase 1995: 151). 
Within the provinces the local governments have a relationship to the provincial 
governments resembling that of a unitary state. Local governments may pass laws binding to 
their constituents, but this power has been delegated from the provincial authorities and 
could be withdrawn (Boase 1995: 152).      
6.1.1 The Constitution Act of 1867 
The Constitution Act of 1867 codifies how the legislative authorities are divided between 
Canada and the provinces. Sections 91, 93(4), 94, 100, 106, and 132 list the powers exclusive 
to the Parliament of Canada. Powers exclusive to the provincial legislatures are listed in 
sections 92, 92A, and 93, and sections 94A and 95 name the concurrent powers. 
Of special interest are the provincial powers. According to section 92A in the Constitution 
Act 186753:  
“(1) In each province, the legislature may exclusively make laws in relation to (a) exploration for non-
renewable natural resources in the province; (b) development, conservation and management of non-
renewable natural resources and forestry resources in the province, including laws in relation to the 
rate of primary production therefrom; and (c) development, conservation and management of sites 
and facilities in the province for the generation and production of electrical energy.”  
“(4) In any province, the legislature may make laws in relation to the raising of money by any mode or 
system of taxation in respect of (a) non-renewable natural resources and forestry resources in the 
province and the primary production therefrom, and (b) sites and facilities in the province for the 
generation of electrical energy and the production therefrom.”  
In Alberta 81 percent of mineral rights are owned by Albertans through the provincial 
government. The federal government and private actors share the remaining 19 percent54.        
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The basis of federal power rests in section 9155: 
“It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate and House of 
Commons, to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada, in relation to all 
Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures 
of the Provinces…” 
Section 91 applies as a general rule except for the rights assigned to the provinces under 
section 92 of the Act. In addition, section 91 lists 29 specific items that are exclusively 
belonging to the federal government including: trade, commerce, banking, credit, currency, 
taxation, citizenship, and defense (Jackson, Jackson and Baxter-Moore 1986: 192). However, 
the Act clearly assigns ownership of resources to the provinces, but gives the federal 
government a major voice in sales of resources through its control of inter-provincial and 
international trade (ibid.).56  
6.1.2 Equalization Payments 
On average for the Canadian provinces transfers from the federal government finance more 
than 20 percent of provincial spending. The transfers are general rather than being targeted 
to specific provincial expenditures, and have two main components: the first component is 
an equalization system, which consists of unconditional payments to the provinces whose 
fiscal capacity is below the national norm; the second component is a set of transfers meant 
to contribute to financing the provinces’ provision of health, welfare, and post-secondary 
education (Boadway 2008: 109-110). In Alberta there is a belief that federal equalization 
payments “rob” the Albertans, as Alberta receives no equalization payments57. The province 
receives no equalization payments due to its large revenue collection from oil and gas. As 
mentioned above, the equalization payments, or transfer payments, is a federal policy to 
diminish economic differences between provinces, and is meant to ensure that all provinces 
have approximately the same ability to provide public services58. This is codified in 
                                                 
55
 Government of Canada (14.04.12): http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/Const/Const_index.html 
56
 Found at (21.03.12): http://www.mapleleafweb.com/features/provincial-government-canada-organization-
institutions-issues  
57
 See Unlimitedmagazine.com (15.04.12): http://www.unlimitedmagazine.com/2011/04/why-everything-your-
uncle-says-about-transfer-payments-is-wrong/ 
58
 Government of Canada (14.04.12): http://www.fin.gc.ca/fedprov/eqp-eng.asp 
28 
 
subsection 36(2) of the Constitution Act 198259. Boadway (2008: 110) recognizes that while 
the equalization system equalizes the poor provinces up, it implicitly equalizes the rich 
provinces down. However, to keep fiscal disparities between provinces at a minimum is seen 
as an important principle, and equalization payments is the only fiscal arrangement that 
enjoys constitutional status.        
6.2 Monetary system 
Alberta utilizes the Canadian dollar and hence has no currency of its own or independent 
provincial bank. Bank of Canada provides the currency and the primary interest rate, which 
means that Alberta is part of a large monetary system operated from Ottawa60. For the 
provinces this means that economic policy (i.e. provincial spending) will not necessarily 
affect the national currency in relation to foreign currencies, most importantly the American 
Dollar. Neither will high or low provincial spending necessarily provide reason for the Bank 
of Canada to increase or lower the primary interest rate. This provides the provinces with 
substantial room for maneuver when it comes to economic policy. Classic economic theory 
says that high spending of public money eventually will inflate the economy (see Barro and 
Grilli 1994). This can be damaging to industry and workplaces in a globalized world when 
products may be produced cheaper elsewhere (Mankiw 2002: 238-255). The Canadian 
dollar, the currency used in Alberta, however, is not necessarily greatly affected by the 
provincial economic activities in Alberta because the currency has a volume much greater 
than the Albertan economy. In theory this may allow higher public spending with a smaller 
risk of inflating the currency. If the province should choose to spend a high amount of public 
money on welfare such as education, health care, and infrastructure it has a diminished risk 
of inflating the economy and seeing the currency appreciate. Alberta has chosen a path of 
low taxation, however public spending is maintained due to revenue collected from the oil 
and gas industry. Politically and economically this makes sense because the province can 
lower taxes on production and consumption, and still provide public education and 
healthcare. In turn, this has formed an environment for high economic activity and growth, 
referring to the numbers above.  
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6.3 Political economy 
6.3.1 Business Investment in Alberta - the Importance of Oil and Gas Industries 
The Government of Alberta reports61: Alberta’s business investment as share of GDP is 
higher than the Canadian average, and in comparison to other provinces Alberta had the 
largest investment share of GDP between 1981 and 2009. This is mainly due to the capital-
intensive nature of resource production, and resource rich provinces have a tendency to 
have higher business investment as share of GDP. The main source of business investment in 
Alberta has been the oil and gas industry due to the industry’s capital-intensive nature. The 
oil and gas industry contributed more than 50 percent on average to total business 
investment in Alberta from 2000 to 2010. As a consequence of this, increases and decreases 
in oil and gas investment dominate the total investment picture in the province. Hence, due 
to the volatility of investment in oil and gas industries, Alberta business investment is very 
volatile.  
Over the years investment in the oil and gas industry have continued to grow, 
however its composition has changed. The investment growth from 1991 to 1996 was 
mainly due to increases in conventional oil and gas investments. During this time, the 
conventional sector, as opposed to non-conventional sector of oil sands, played a larger role 
in total investment as can be seen by the higher number of conventional oil and gas wells. 
Production from the conventional wells also dwarfed production from non-conventional 
methods in the early nineties and peaked in 2006. The decline in conventional oil and gas 
investment after 2006 was partly due to fall in the price of natural gas, and the depletion of 
conventional oil reserves. This made non-conventional oil production an important source of 
business investment in the province62. 
6.3.2 Oil Sands 
The business investment in Alberta is, as mentioned, concentrated in oil and gas. In the early 
nineties conventional oil drove the investments until reserves declined or were depleted. 
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However, in the early 2000s regulatory changes and a favorable price environment 
stimulated investment in non-conventional oil production. Non-conventional oil became a 
more profitable energy investment option as a result of the introduction of the 1997 generic 
oil sands royalty regime that established industry-wide royalty costs for oil sands producers. 
The new framework took into account the capital-intensive nature of oil sands development 
and the generic royalty regime, and combined with an increase in oil price from 1999 to 
2008, this permitted investments to grow at a higher rate than in the early nineties63. 
The oil sands royalty regime is called generic because equal rates and rules apply for 
all oil sands projects. The regime is based on revenue minus cost (net revenue), and royalty 
is paid to the government at one or two rates depending on the project’s financial status. 
The generic royalty regime was created to make it easier for developers to evaluate 
investment plans and hence encourage investment in the oil sands. The regime is based on 
legislation, rather than individual agreements with the Crown, which used to be the norm 
prior to the 1997 royalty regime64. The Generic Royalty Regime shows Alberta’s commitment 
to encourage investments in the non-conventional oil industry. By producing a standard set 
of rules for royalty payments the investors can evade the uncertainty of Crown negotiations. 
This makes it easier for potential producers to estimate revenues before production begins.    
6.3.3 Recent Global Recession: 
The global recession and the decrease in commodity prices in 2009 led to a fall in total oil 
and gas investment. This resulted in a decrease in both conventional and non-conventional 
investment. Estimates by Statistics Canada show that there was a 61.3 percent increase in 
drilling activity in 2010, however there was a further decrease in investment in the oil and 
gas extraction industry. The decrease was mainly due to a fall in conventional oil and gas 
investment. Looking ahead, non-conventional oil is expected to be the main source of 
investment in the industry and a key driver of business investment in Alberta. The business 
investment in Alberta fluctuates, and this affects the economic growth. Not surprisingly, 
increases in business investment place upward pressure on GDP while decreases in business 
investment apply downward pressure. In the 1980’s business investment declined in Alberta 
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and this slowed economic growth in the province. After 1989 real business investment grew 
on average at a rate higher than real GDP growth. From 1990 until today business 
investment together with export demand and personal consumption, have been the drivers 
of the economic growth in Alberta65.  
These numbers show that the Alberta economy is sensitive to external events. The 
global recession beginning in 2008 had a great effect on the investment climate in the 
province. Lacking a substantial savings fund, like the Norwegian government pension fund, 
the Alberta economy will remain vulnerable to volatile oil prices making budgeting a 
daunting task for provincial politicians. This notion is underlined by the Alberta 
government66, which reports that Alberta’s investment climate is expected to remain volatile 
because of its reliance on oil and gas. 
6.4 The Funds 
6.4.1 The Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund  
The Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund (AHSF) was established in 1976 when the Alberta 
Heritage Savings Trust Fund Act received Royal Assent. The AHSF’s portfolio consists of 
investments in private and public companies, bonds, real estate, and infrastructure 
investments both domestically and abroad. The investments are balanced on two concepts: 
diversification and a long term planning horizon67. This is to manage risk and to secure 
greater returns. Initially the fund received 30 percent of net revenue from oil production in 
Alberta, however in the early eighties this was altered to 15 percent (Tsalik 2003: 27). In 
1987 further additions to the fund were halted altogether68, and as of December 2011 the 
fund is valued at C$15.4 billion69. The rationale behind the establishment of AHSF was to 
save for future generations and to provide income to support government liabilities like 
health care and education. Yet, as Alberta’s debt grew in their pursuit for economic 
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diversification, the legislature decided to use fund income for the reduction of debt, and also 
to finance ordinary government expenditure. The AHSF was created through a regular 
legislative process hence the management structure, investment rules, and organization can 
be amended by a simple majority vote in the legislature. During the years of its existence the 
AHSF has altered directions regularly in response to shifts in oil revenues and legislative 
priorities (Tsalik 2003: 26).  
6.4.2 The Sustainability Fund 
In 2003 the government of Alberta created The Sustainability Fund. The key proposal that 
led to the establishment of the fund came from the Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
Alberta (ICAA)70. The ICAA argued that the creation of a ‘Stability Fund’ would help ease the 
effects of constantly changing energy prices. The recommendation was to use the fund to 
cover budget deficits as opposed to being used on further spending. This would create a 
stable operating environment, where the government could be less concerned with 
fluctuating resource revenues71. Today, the Sustainability Fund sets aside funds to offset the 
cost of emergencies and disasters, to pay for natural gas rebates, to manage unexpected 
declines in budget revenues, and to fund settlements with First Nations72. Every year all 
unallocated surpluses go to the Sustainability Fund73 and from there it can be reallocated to 
other accounts, if the fund’s balance exceeds C$2.5 billion. Yet since 2008 no funds have 
been added to the Sustainability Fund due to economic downturn.  
6.5 Rents 
In Alberta the provincial government grants the right to explore and develop natural 
resources. In exchange of this, the exploring companies pay royalties to the provincial 
government. For freehold right owners, typically farmers who have minor oil wells on their 
                                                 
70
 Institute of Chartered Accountants of Alberta: http://www.albertacas.ca/Home.aspx 
71
 University of Alberta (04.08.12): 
http://www.business.ualberta.ca/Centres/CABREE/Energy/~/media/business/Centres/CABREE/Documents/En
ergy/Oil/ZapisockySustainabilityFundBUEC.ashx 
72
 Alberta Financial Investment and Planning Advisory Commission (04.08.12): 
http://www.finance.alberta.ca/publications/other/2008-0131-fipac-final-report.pdf 
73
 University of Alberta (04.08.12): 
http://www.business.ualberta.ca/Centres/CABREE/Energy/~/media/business/Centres/CABREE/Documents/En
ergy/Oil/ZapisockySustainabilityFundBUEC.ashx 
33 
 
property, the provincial government charges an annual tax for production. The Alberta 
royalty and tax system consists of:74 
Royalty System 
-The bonus bid system is the public offering of petroleum and natural gas resources owned by Albertans. The 
mineral rights are issued through a competitive sealed-bid auction system and the rights are leased to the 
highest bidder. 
-Royalties are levied based on the value of production. 
Taxes 
-A freehold mineral tax is levied on the value of oil and natural gas production from non-Crown (freehold) 
mineral rights. The rates vary for natural gas and oil, 
-Companies pay corporate income taxes to both the provincial and the federal governments, and 
-Local municipal taxes are charged where applicable. 
Between 1994 and 2008 the Alberta government collected on average C$6 billion in royalties 
and taxes from non-renewable resource production. This includes conventional oil, oil sands, 
and natural gas. Royalty revenues peaked in 2009 with C$12 billion, but fell substantially to 
C$7 billion in 2010 and C$8 billion in 2011. The numbers below picture the net revenue 
collected from royalties and taxes from oil and gas production by the Alberta government 
between 1990 and 201075: 
Table 3 
 
This shows the volatility of resource revenues, and how the ability of revenues collected 
from such resources to fund government programs fluctuates. Between 2003 and 2008 
roughly half of the collected revenue from oil production was saved in the Sustainability 
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Fund, however with the onset of the global recession in 2008 Alberta was no longer able to 
save for future needs76. All of the non-renewable resource revenue, as well as substantial 
amounts from the Sustainability Fund, were spent on running provincial costs. The 
government of Alberta estimates that non-renewable revenue will continue to grow in the 
coming years and that it will provide C$16 billion in 201577.  
6.6 Summary 
Alberta is a province in the Canadian federation and has limited, yet extensive, jurisdictional 
autonomy. Important decision authority concerning the right to natural resources found on 
their territory, and the revenue coming from its production, is left to the provinces, in 
addition to the duty to provide health care, education, and infrastructure. The economy of 
the province is highly dependent on oil production and international oil prices, and this 
makes for fluctuating budgets. Oil and gas rents are low, and the AHSF has been left to itself 
without further adding’s since 1987. In 2003 the Sustainability Fund was established meant 
to provide financial stability, yet since 2008 no revenue has been added to the fund due to 
economic downturn.   
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The following sections will feature the main analysis of the independent variables political 
culture and political institutional structure. The first chapter in this part, 7 Jurisdictional 
Autonomy, will comment on important differences concerning jurisdictional autonomy and 
argue that the cases are fairly similar in this regard. The following chapters, 8 Political 
Culture and 9 Political Institutional structure, will analyze these factors influence on eventual 
policy outcome. A discussion on resource curse susceptibility and market systems will also 
feature in these chapters. The last chapter is on the 10 Dutch Disease and the occurrence of 
this phenomenon, in the two cases, will be analyzed.  
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7 Jurisdictional Autonomy 
An important distinction between Alberta and Norway is, as mentioned, the differences in 
jurisdictional autonomy. Alberta’s government is in certain respects subordinate to the 
federal government in Ottawa, and is part of a larger federation. Norway, on the other hand, 
is a sovereign unitary state in Europe, as described previously. These differences have 
implications on the policy options on economic matters available to the two cases. Before 
the analysis of the main explanatory variables, the key economic implications concerning the 
differences in jurisdictional autonomy will be addressed.   
International political economy is focused on how market pressures constantly lead 
to reallocation of productive activities internationally, and how states try to intervene by 
bending market forces to their favor (Schwartz 1994: 4). States were able to control market 
forces in most of the post-World War II period, and hence it can be assumed that they will 
be able to do so in the future. According to Schwartz (1994) though, this assumption is 
wrong. There is a convergence of the world economy towards what was seen in the late 
nineteen century and, thus, away from that of the mid-twentieth century. International 
movement of labor, capital, commodities, and firms is descriptive of the global economy of 
the late twentieth century e.g. within trading blocs like the North American Free Trade 
Association (NAFTA) and the European Economic Area (EEA). Accordingly, states’ options 
and possibilities of controlling market forces diminish. Alberta is a part of NAFTA through 
being a province in Canada. This means that NAFTA legislation will affect Alberta 
government policies and the strategies of firms located in Alberta. According to the 
Economist78 Canada’s main reason for entering NAFTA was to maintain healthy bilateral 
connections with the United States, and a former Canadian government official commented 
that “NAFTA holds back bilateral ties”. From this it can be understood that Canada is not 
entirely content with the restrictions on economic policies that come with NAFTA. However, 
trade between Canada and Mexico has grown fivefold since the inauguration of NAFTA in 
1994 to US$21 billion today, so there are extensive economic benefits related to NAFTA 
membership.  
Norwegian government policies and firm strategies must adapt to EEA legislation to 
remain competitive in the European Union (EU) internal market. Norway has the possibility 
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to refrain from implementing EU legislation in domestic laws. However this option has yet to 
be practiced. A general fear of retaliation by the EU and possible exclusion from the EEA are 
some of the reasons for this. The Data Retention Directive is an example of EU legislation 
that has been ratified by the Norwegian parliament despite hard criticism from parts of the 
political opposition, civil society, and even within the coalition government. Some critics 
point to the Norwegian authorities’ fear of standing up against the EU. In 2011 the Labor 
Party national congress voted no to the implementation of the EU Postal Directive79, which 
would abolish the Norwegian Postal service’s monopoly on providing postal services. If the 
Norwegian government in the future decides to say no to the Postal Directive it will be the 
first time Norway refrains from the implementation of an EU directive.    
As the examples above illustrate neither Norway nor Alberta are shielded from 
external events and pressures. By being a small state Norway’s economy relies heavily on 
global and regional markets. The same applies to Alberta as a relatively small jurisdiction 
within the Canadian federation. Alberta does not have the same possibilities as Norway to 
enter, or refrain to enter, international trade agreements since foreign policy of this sort lies 
with federal government in Ottawa. Yet, as shown above, this does not necessarily mean 
that Norway is more autonomous than Alberta in these matters as the relative international 
strength of Norway is weak. Norway, as Alberta has to conform to decisions made in Ottawa, 
often needs to follow decisions made in Brussels and elsewhere. Following this, the 
argument can be made that both Alberta and Norway are de facto influenced by far-reaching 
economic policies made outside their jurisdictional limits. 
A pertinent distinction between Alberta and Norway is that Alberta is part of a larger 
monetary union while Norway is not. This means that Norway has to take developments in 
the value of the national currency into consideration when determining economic policy. As 
argued in previous chapters, excess domestic spending of natural resource revenue may lead 
to an appreciating currency. The Norwegian government has therefore developed polices 
aimed at protecting a stable value of the krone. In Alberta, these considerations are of less 
concern, because excess spending is less likely to make the Canadian dollar appreciate and 
hence larger spending may be viable. Yet Macdonald (2007) upholds that the high spending 
of resource revenue seen in Alberta has made the Canadian dollar appreciate, most notably, 
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toward the American dollar. This implies that even though Alberta is part of a larger 
monetary union it is not entirely shielded from currency fluctuations due to its own fiscal 
priorities. Nevertheless it must be expected that the effect would be even greater if Alberta 
was sporting its own currency, as Norway does. Yet for Norway, founded in macroeconomic 
theory presented above, it makes sense to restrain the use of revenue coming from oil and 
gas80.  
Another factor relevant for the comparison between the two jurisdictions is the 
matter of the Central bank concerning the primary interest rate. In Norway, the Central bank 
provides the Norwegian krone and sets the primary interest rate. As mentioned earlier, 
Norwegian policies aim at an inflation target of 2.5 percent. This is mainly to protect 
domestic business against international competition, and thereby secure Norwegian 
employment. A probable result of overly spending of oil and gas revenue is a rise in the 
primary interest rate. Accordingly, the option of excess spending should be controlled. 
Alberta does not have its own Central bank because it is a province in Canada. High spending 
of oil and gas money is therefore less likely to instigate an interest rate increase by the Bank 
of Canada, since the Bank of Canada takes economic developments concerning the whole 
federation into account when determining its actions.  
7.1 Summary 
Following the arguments above Alberta and Norway are both influenced by external events 
when it comes to economic policy making, and both have to pay attention to the effects on 
their currencies related to public spending. The matter of the primary interest rate, though, 
seems to be a greater concern for Norwegian policymakers than for their Albertan 
colleagues. 
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8 Political Culture 
In this chapter the political cultures of Alberta and Norway will be described and analyzed 
with regard to the implications the differences in culture have on the dependent variable. 
The fact that Alberta and Norway differ in the respects presented in the previous chapter is 
arguably part of the explanation of why the policy options concerning the allocation of 
resource revenue differ in the two cases. Yet it does not explain why Alberta has opted not 
to save some of the vast wealth coming from oil and gas for future generations and as 
protection against vagaries in world markets.  
8.1 Operationalization 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, political culture may be one of the important 
factors explaining the variances seen on the dependent variable. Obviously there are intra-
culture variations in any community, thus an analysis relying on culture as an explanatory 
variable should have solid theoretic and empiric backing. In an attempt to define political 
culture as a concept Pye (1965: 7) argues that there is a limited and distinct political culture 
in any specific community and that this provides meaning and probability to the political 
process. Verba (1965) contends that political culture is empirical beliefs and values that 
define the sphere where political action takes place. Almond and Verba (1989: 12) defines 
political culture as the specific political orientations, meaning attitudes toward the political 
system and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system. They further argue that 
through the role of culture it is possible to locate special attitudes and tendencies for 
political behavior in varying parts of the political system. In an attempt to define political 
culture as an explanatory variable Wildavsky (1987) claims that “support for and opposition 
to different ways of life, the shared values legitimating social relations (here called cultures) 
are the generators of diverse preferences”. He further contends that individuals use political 
cultures to develop their preferences. From this perspective, political culture becomes a 
pattern that shapes our preferences, and is thereby not reduced to an echo of something 
else. This way political culture can answer how preferences are developed, in opposition to 
rational choice theories where preferences are givens (Østerud 2007a: 198).  
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Following this, this thesis employs political culture as related to the general notion of 
the state-capital relationship in Norway and Alberta, one which is fitting for both decision 
makers and citizens, in an attempt to show why Alberta and Norway differ on the question 
of government fund saving. In accordance with Wildavsky (1987), this paper argues that the 
political cultures of the two jurisdictions shape the preferences of its citizens and 
policymakers on the question at hand, and is therefore a relevant factor in explaining the 
differences seen in policy outcome.   
There are certainly cultural differences within Alberta and Norway, but a basic level 
of similarity is assumed. Arguably the presence of cultural cleavages in a society does not 
invalidate the occurrence of essential patterns that can have political consequences. On that 
account the political cultures of Alberta and Norway will be presented along with the 
argument that these differences have important effects on the dependent variable.  
8.2 Norway: Political Culture 
Norway was freed from Danish rule in 1814, and went into a union with Sweden that lasted 
until 1905 when full independence was achieved (Østerud 2007b: 2). Heidar (2001) writes 
that the 91 union years were marked by a careful effort to build a mass-based, unitary 
culture. Two dimensions that define Norwegian culture are a principle of egalitarianism and 
a sense of community (Østerud 2007b: 3). These two cultural factors contributed to a state-
capital relationship where an active role of the state in economic activities was legitimized 
and foreign capital was looked upon with skepticism. In turn, Norwegian culture is defined, 
as mentioned in the introductory chapter, as “egalitarian individualism” (see Gullestad 1992; 
Eriksen 1993) where equality and integrity of the individual are highly valued. Egalitarian 
individualism expresses itself through the rejection of formal social hierarchies, and the 
social democratic ideology expresses such values of equality, which again are embedded in 
the welfare state (Andersen 1984 in Eriksen 1993).  
Equality is part of the Norwegian self-image. In cultural terms, this is often seen as a Nordic trait: “the 
passion for equality”. Even within the Nordic area, Norway has a special history of strong egalitarian 
tradition (Heidar 2001: 167). 
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The egalitarianism found in Norway has stimulated and justified several active government 
roles and policies including: legal provision for equality between genders, a progressive 
taxation system and a heavily subsidized rural sector amongst others (Gullestad 1992). 
According to Andreß and Heinen (2001), a by-product of egalitarianism is citizen 
supportiveness of governmental action in various activities, including industrial activities. 
Eckstein (1966: 78) contends that Norwegians have a higher, overarching attitude of 
solidarity in that they in fact display in many features of their behavior a deep sense of 
community. The Norwegian sense of community is primarily political, but the political 
sentiments and behavior patterns that they encompass are expressive of much more general 
attitudes and modes of acting (Eckstein 1966). Egalitarianism and the sense of community 
include notions about the shared responsibilities between the state and the citizen, 
including the state role in economic affairs as a means to provide for the Norwegian 
community, and attitudes towards foreign capital. Both dimensions have withstood the test 
of time and are recognized as core elements of modern Norwegian political culture (ibid.). 
Christensen (2003) emphasizes the prevalence of the core ideas of state-led economic 
development in Norwegian society, in a discussion of the central state tradition in Norway. 
The development of the central state settled a legitimate and active role in economic affairs 
of the government, amounting to “a regulated capitalist state where social justice was 
guaranteed by the state reallocation of collective goods” (Christensen 2003: 168). Andersen 
(1993) draws on government engagement in hydropower and large-scale industry sectors in 
the post-World War II period to exemplify Norway’s tradition of regulation and state 
intervention in economic activities, and how this was viewed as the most sensible option for 
policymakers. When oil and gas discoveries were made in the North Sea in the sixties, state 
control and contribution was already common in several Norwegian industries (Lind and 
Mackay 1980), and Heidar (2001) notes that there has traditionally been a strong state 
involvement in the Norwegian economy. The welfare state is robust, and is institutionalized 
through an active state where core politics involve keeping unemployment low and 
maintaining a fair geographical distribution of wealth.  
There exists empirical evidence to back the notion of egalitarianism and the role of 
the state in Norway. In 1999 a national survey about social inequality was conducted by 
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Lund, Frisvold, and Kalgraff Skjåk81, and these are some of the findings: (the numbers 
presented are total, not distinguishing between age, gender, or education. The possible 
answer “do not know” has been left out). 
Table 4 
  
Table 5 
 
The answers given provide a vivid picture of Norwegians wish for social equality and 
government responsibility in the process of reaching this goal. Especially the numbers about 
government responsibility toward providing jobs and the living standard of the unemployed 
are unambiguous. More than two thirds think income differences in Norway are too large, 
yet only 59.9% believe the state should be responsible for the reduction of the perceived 
differences, and as many as 36.6% answered negatively or ambiguously to state 
responsibility on this matter. This implies that there are sentiments wishing for less state 
interference. Yet, seen together the numbers underline the proclaimed notion of egalitarian 
individualism and its features of equality and state involvement.   
Table 6 
 
Table 7 
 
The numbers in table 6 and 7 show a clear public inclination toward typical social democratic 
policies of universal health care and education. However 18.7 percent think it is “very just” 
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"strongly agree" or "strongly disagree" or "neither"
"agree" "disagree"
Large differences in income are necessary for a country's prosperity: 16.0% 54.5% 25.1%
Differences in income in Norway are too large: 71.5% 13.5% 13.6%
It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in
income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes: 59.9% 19.0% 17.7%
"absolutely" or "probably not" or 
"probably" "absolutely not"
The government has a responsibility to provide jobs for everybody: 85.4% 11.3%
The government is responible for the living standard of the unemployed: 88.9% 4.9%
Is it just or unjust - right or wrong - that people with higher incomes can: "very just" or "just" "very unjust" or "unjust" "neither"
buy better health care than people with lower incomes? 18.7% 63.6% 16.1%
buy better education for their children than people with lower incomes? 14.7% 66.4% 16.2%
"much higher" or "much lower" or "lower" "same"
"higher"
Do you think people with high incomes should pay a larger share of
their income in taxes than those with low incomes, the same share, 
or a smaller share? 74.4% 1.4% 22.1%
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or “just” that people with higher incomes should have the possibility to spend this on better 
health care. Apparently there is a fairly high number of Norwegians who do not perceive the 
model of universality found in egalitarianism, to be the preferred option. Yet almost two 
thirds have the opinion that individuals with high incomes should pay a larger share of their 
income in taxes than others. Seen together, the numbers presented above arguably provide 
empirical evidence about the notion of egalitarian individualism in Norwegian society, 
although the numbers show that there are sentiments wishing for less state interference and 
more economic ‘individualism’.   
8.2.1 Political rule/government 
In 28 of the last 40 years Norway has been governed by the Labor Party, or a coalition led by 
the Labor Party. In March 1971 the Social Democrats took office and maintained its position 
throughout the seventies, only interrupted by a short visit by the centrist parties that lasted 
one year from October 1972 to October 1973. The dominance by the Labor Party in the 
seventies coincided with the period when oil was discovered in the North Sea. Hence the 
Labor Party was instrumental in the development of guidelines for petroleum ownership and 
development. The idea was public ownership and that the potential revenue should benefit 
the population of Norway through public spending. The policies of the Labor Party are aimed 
at creating and maintaining a coordinated market system where natural resources, industry, 
manufacturing, science, and labor were utilized to the common good for land and people 
(Nordby 1993: 7).  
According to the Labor Party’s political platform a steady economic environment is 
imperative for the development of Norwegian businesses and work places. The party also 
states that petroleum revenue provides society with incredible wealth and that the creation 
of the Government Pension Fund Abroad helps share the wealth among citizens today and 
through generations82. The Labor Party argues that redistribution of wealth is about equality 
and fairness, but that redistribution also aids economic growth. They claim that the 
Norwegian economy is hallmarked by high economic growth and equal distribution of 
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earnings83. To achieve this combination of economic redistribution and growth the Labor 
Party launched, in the decades following World War II, a form of corporatism where both 
labor and capital had to submit to social control (Nordby 1993: 7). The notions inherent in 
egalitarian individualism, as noted above, support the stated principles of the Labor Party of 
fair distribution of wealth in society and a state owned petroleum fund and forms a rather 
vivid connection between Labor Party policies and political culture.  
Arguably, the acclaimed cultural features presented above allow the state to 
interfere in the economy with policies intended to improve its operations. High income tax 
levels, a state owned oil-company and high taxes on production for external operating 
companies are descriptive of the policies. For example are income tax levels (oil adjusted) in 
Norway 45.4 percent compared to an OECD average of 33 percent84. For the oil and gas 
producers lower tax rates on production would leave more autonomy to the market, but on 
the other hand debilitate the state’s ability to extract rents and coordinate operations. The 
extraction of oil and gas rents on production is imperative for the state’s ability to 
redistribute the revenues from oil production, thus the high levels of rent are coherent with 
the equality inherent in the notion of egalitarian individualism. The Labor Party arguably 
personifies central features of Norwegian culture and this may explain their resilience to win 
elections on a regular basis and thus to maintain government control. It can therefore, by 
referring to the survey results presented above, be inferred that the close state-capital 
policies pursued by the Labor Party have vast public backing. Røed Larsen (2004: 21) 
contends that the public is content with government involvement in the economy because 
they see visible positive economic results from the arrangements. The positive effects are 
visible on macroeconomic indicators such as unemployment, inflation, and GDP/cap, as 
presented in chapter 4.2 Independent Variables.  
Macroeconomic theory tells us that overly spending of petroleum revenue will lead 
to real appreciation, which in turn could lead to higher unemployment rates, higher inflation 
rates, and then slower GDP/growth (Vale 2007). The room for maneuver is therefore limited 
for Norwegian policymakers contemplating where to allocate the extensive revenues coming 
from oil and gas production, unless the labor base can be increased accordingly. The solution 
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of severing the economy in two, keeping oil and gas revenue apart from the general 
economy, was consequently the preferred choice of Norwegian policymakers. This option 
has an obvious economic rationale, as argued above, but it also has mainstream public 
backing through the cultural features of egalitarian individualism. From this it can be 
inferred that government fund savings is coherent with the underlying cultural context of 
Norway, because it helps maintaining a preferred level of economic equality within society.  
8.3 Alberta Political Culture 
8.3.1 Western Alienation 
A central feature of Albertan political culture is the notion of western alienation (Gilsdorf 
1979; Gibbins 1979), which is a conception of marginalization and alienation from the 
central decision-making authorities of politics and economics. The concept can be 
summarized as follows: 
Western alienation is best seen as a political ideology of regional discontent. By this I mean that 
western alienation embodies a socially shared set of interrelated beliefs with some degree of cultural 
embodiment and intellectual articulation, with a recognized  history and constituency, and with 
recognized spokesmen and carriers of the creed (Gibbins 1980: 169). 
There is empirical evidence to back the notion of western alienation in Alberta, historically 
(see Gibbins 1979, Gilsdorf 1979), and in present day (see Lawson 2005). Lawson (2005) 
focuses on alienation defined as “the alienation of citizens in western Canada from political 
representatives, processes of political decision-making, and institutions of representative 
government”. This research shows that western alienation is an important component of 
Albertan political culture. There is contempt for government intervention, especially federal, 
but also provincial, and this has resulted in a notion of alienation from the federal decision 
makers in Ottawa.  
A large part of western alienation is the lack of trust in government. A survey from 
1968 denotes that Albertans score low in terms of trust in both federal and provincial 
government (Simeon and Elkins 1974). Further evidence is found in Gibbins (1979) study. In 
the questionnaire Albertans were confronted with:  
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Table 8 
 
The answers given here clearly show that Albertans feel that federal policies are geared to 
the benefit of Ontario and Quebec at the expense of Alberta. In a more recent study by 
Pickup, Sayers, Knopff, and Archer (2004), the researchers show that Albertans have a 
negative inclination toward government and that these inclinations have actual political 
connotations. This is arguably part of the explanation of why public ownership of natural 
resources historically has been rejected in the province.  
As described previously the province’ ownership rights to natural resources is 
constitutionally guaranteed, and Albertans contribute with more federal taxes than their 
fellow countrymen through equalization payments. However, federal tax-rates are equal in 
all the provinces, and some of this tax revenue is canalized back to the lesser well off 
provinces to ensure a certain degree of economic equality between provinces. Alberta 
receives no equalization payments due to their large revenues from natural resource 
production. Thus, Alberta is equalized down (Boadway: 2008: 110). This has in turn led to a 
belief that the federal government is robbing Albertans, as their federal tax payments are 
being implemented elsewhere to keep other provinces running85. When confronted with the 
statement below, found in the same 1979 Gibbins study presented above, Albertans 
answered:  
Table 9 
 
These numbers underline the notion of the alienation Albertans feel toward the rest of the 
federation. Only 32.1 percent strongly or moderately agree that they share the rest of 
Canada’s prosperity. However indirectly, the revenue from Alberta’s substantial natural 
resources is being redistributed to other provinces through the equalization system. The 
general resentment to contribute through equalization payments strengthens the view of 
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73.6% 9.6%
If one part of Canada suffers we all suffer, and if one region "strongly agree" or "strongly disagree" or
prospers we all share in the prosperity: "moderatly agree" "moderatly disagree"
32.1% 56.8%
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western alienation where ownership of natural resources is an important feature. The 
resentment to government in western alienation contributes to fortify the belief that 
Albertans are being robbed of their oil and gas fortune. Seen together these features 
inherent in western alienation lock in and reinforce unwillingness and inaptitude to save 
resource revenue for future generations and expenses, because the public has a negative 
inclination toward government. By looking at western alienation as a premise for the low 
fund savings in Alberta, it is hardly surprising that the option of high savings has been left to 
secure tax rebates for provincial corporations and individuals. 
8.3.2 Prairie Provinces  
The Canadian prairie-provinces (Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba) are often said to 
have their own unique political culture, different from other provinces in Canada (Norman 
1972: 25). There are naturally different views and orientations within given jurisdictions, but 
Alberta, and the other prairie provinces, distinctly exhibit values like individualism, free 
market economy, and a contempt for federal government interference in provincial political 
life. Gibbins (1979: 143) describes it: 
A strong belief in the spirit if not necessarily the practice of free enterprise, a concomitant belief in the 
desirability if not the actuality of small, fiscally conservative governments, a tolerance if not affection 
for one-party government, and an intense commitment to provincial control of energy resources.  
According to the literature Albertan political culture is in short: a belief in the right to free 
enterprise, a sentiment of western alienation, and mistrust in government. Free enterprise 
and government distrust point in a direction of leaving most of the revenue to be handled 
directly by the market and it can thus be argued that a general distrust in government has 
debilitated the prospects of substantial fund savings. 
The Government of Alberta reports86: The Alberta government has a low-tax policy 
intended for long-term economic benefits for its citizens. Alberta has competitive levels of 
business taxes compared to other business environments in North America. In 2012 the 
combined federal/provincial corporate income tax rate is 25 percent, which is a 1.5 percent 
reduction from 2011. In comparison the average corporate income tax for the United States 
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is 39.2 percent in 2011. Alberta has no provincial capital tax, no payroll taxes, and no sales 
taxes, combined with a publicly funded health care insurance system. It is the natural 
resources that form the foundation of Alberta’s economy, and this is combined with a 
positive business climate based on low taxation to attract investment to encourage Alberta 
businesses to compete with international businesses abroad. For the past 20 years Alberta 
has had an average annual growth (GDP) of 3.2 percent, and this number shows that Alberta 
leads all other Canadian provinces in terms of GDP growth in this period.  
The report by the Government of Alberta underlines the belief in small government 
and low taxation, and that this is the best way to encourage investment and stimulate 
economic growth in the province. Low taxes encourage business and entrepreneurship, and 
this resonates well with the ideal of free enterprise and the policies of the ruling Alberta 
Progressive Conservatives (presented below). The PC have remained in power uninterrupted 
since 1971. Arguably, their resilience to stay in government is fortified by their liberal 
policies that personify the notions inherent in western alienation. Albertans have been asked 
in surveys how they preferred the resource revenues handled and said yes to tax rebates at 
the expense of increased savings, as mentioned above. By keeping taxes and royalty rates 
low resource revenue produced in the province befalls in a large extent to companies and 
individuals, thus keeping the revenue away from government control, coherent with the 
policies of the Alberta Conservatives and the answers given by the Alberta citizens.  
The Fraser Institute (2006)87 rates Alberta as the freest economy in Canada, and in a 
2008 report: as the second freest of all Canadian provinces and American states88. This 
comes as no surprise considering the underlying cultural context of western alienation 
combined with the liberal policies of the ruling PC party. A low tax environment is well suited 
to attract capital hence the low tax policies pursued by the Alberta government leave little 
room for rent maximizing and domestic control. The necessity of investment capital and the 
policies it requires, has in turn led to low royalty rates and little revenue available for fund 
saving. The state-capital relationship seen in Alberta obviously restrains the options available 
to policymakers in the province when it comes to tax-rates and royalty levels, and this self-
inflicted confinement obviously reinforces the difficulty of obtaining larger resource rents. 
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8.3.3 Political rule/government 
Government in Alberta is remarkably constant, and the province’ political history can be 
divided into four distinct periods; 1905-1921 Liberals; 1921-1935 UFA (United Farmers of 
Alberta); 1935-1971 Social Credit; 1971-present Conservatives (Bell et al. 2007). The PC have 
won consecutive elections since 1971, which means that Alberta has the highest level of 
one-party dominance in the post-war era in Canada. Alberta also has the third highest 
ranking in the country when looking at the proportion of the popular vote that goes to the 
winning party, with an average of 53 percent between 1945 and 2003. Today the province is 
still governed by the PC. The PC’s policies are aimed at minimizing taxes and thereby 
creating an environment for economic growth through a free enterprise economy. The 
Alberta PC state in their principles that the creation of jobs and economic growth is best 
served by a free enterprise economy89, and thereby their political principles are coherent 
with the cultural traits of free enterprise and the notion of western alienation.  
Dacks (1986) explains Alberta politics by concentrating on western alienation with 
federal institutions combined with identification with a single dominant commodity (grain, 
then oil and gas). The idea is that wealth derived from natural resources found in the 
province should stay in the province, and this transcends social and political class and unites 
people from a variety of occupational categories. Dacks (1986) contends that the outside 
threat mutes the normal class divisions and politics that would otherwise bring about a 
competitive party system. Following this Alberta politics are largely affected by the notion of 
western alienation. The contempt for government in western alienation can in part explain 
why Alberta has chosen to halt payments into the AHSF, as a means to keep large oil and gas 
revenues out of government hands. Further, in Gibbins (1979) survey 79 percent agreed to 
the statement: “Governments in Canada are making the taxpayers pay for too many 
unnecessary services”. This underlines the belief that private enterprises and corporations 
are better suited to handle and invest oil and gas revenue. 
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8.4 Political Culture as an Explanatory Variable 
This chapter has described important aspects of the political cultures in Alberta and Norway, 
and analyzed their effect on the outcome on the dependent variable. The aspects, or 
dimensions, are applied in an attempt to understand and explain why Alberta and Norway 
have chosen different paths in relation to oil revenue fund saving. The analysis does not 
reveal the precise causal mechanism at work, but merely propose that political culture is a 
likely explanatory factor. Lehman (1972: 68) contends that “political culture and culture in 
general are most productively treated as specifying variables for understanding political 
behavior and structural changes”. Therefore, Lehman (1972: 58) argues, that as a specifying 
variable, political culture has only a moderate explanatory effect. Yet Berman (2001: 241) 
argues that preferences and constraints of the environment contribute in determining 
political behavior. Following Wildavsky (1987), political culture can provide the answer to 
how preferences are developed – why people want what they want – thus political culture 
functions as an explanatory variable to why some policy options are preferred over others. 
When individuals make important choices, these choices are at the same time choices of 
culture where shared values legitimate dissimilar patterns of social practices, Wildavsky 
(1987) argue. By employing Wildavsky’s definition on how political culture explains decision 
makers and citizen’s preferences or wants, it is possible to prescribe causal property to the 
concept, because it implies that wants are shaped by culture and are not givens, as opposed 
to the rational theorist position.  
The evidence presented above suggests that political culture, the beliefs and values, 
shape the wants of policymakers and citizens related to the appropriate role of the state in 
economic affairs, and in turn this makes certain policy options more wanted than others. 
Following this, political culture creates a context that provides opportunities and constraints 
for policymakers and is thus a relevant factor in explaining policy choices. Following Almond 
and Verba’s (1989) definition of political culture mentioned previously, it becomes clear that 
the display of different attitudes toward the political system and its parts seen in Alberta and 
Norway have actual political connotations.  
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8.5 Summary, Comparison and Findings 
Political culture is a pertinent explanatory variable as it defines the underlying cultural 
context of the polity in which the political organization occurs. Political cultural dimensions 
shape the wants of citizens and political decision makers and thereby function as a set of 
restrictions and opportunities. Where Albertan culture is characterized by free enterprise 
and distrust in government, Norwegian culture is characterized by unity where equality and 
integrity of the individual are highly valued, which in turn legitimizes an active state in 
economic activities. As argued above these cultural features are largely carried through 
politically by the Alberta PC and in Norway by the Labor Party.  
This thesis argues that the dissimilarities have actual political implications that can be 
seen on the differences in policy outcomes in the two jurisdictions. The Albertan political 
culture disallows government interference and at the same time champions free enterprise 
and low taxes. All of these features naturally lead to low government rents on oil and gas 
production when they are carried out politically. At the same time they imply low levels of 
government-administered fund saving due to the low levels of rent, but also because the 
general resentment to government found in Albertan political culture disallows government 
control over the natural resource revenue. The Norwegian political culture is, contrary to 
Albertan political culture, more open to government interference in the economy. The 
presented literature underlines this notion, and is further strengthened by the survey 
answers given by the Norwegian public. In Norway, due to its cultural traits as described 
above, the political culture has paved the way for the establishment of a government owned 
oil and gas revenue savings fund, because government interference in the economy is 
wanted as a safeguard against societal inequality. Apparently Norwegian political culture 
differs substantially to the Alberta political culture on the question of level of state 
interference in the economy.  
There are however some signs of correlation between the two. The citizens in both 
cases seem to wish for a high(er) degree of public resource revenue spending by referring to 
the numbers presented in chapter The Dependent Variable. Due to the high levels of rent, 
compared to Alberta, the Norwegian government needs to restrict spending to avoid 
overheating the economy cf. Krugman and Wells (2009). Apparently the economic 
considerations, related to excessive natural resource revenue spending, is not in the same 
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degree a concern of the public as for the government in Norway. Alberta, on the other hand, 
may allow high natural resource revenue spending due to the low rents. The difference 
between Norway and Alberta on this account is the derived rents that in Norway amounts to 
C$49 billion (2009), and in Alberta only C$8.4 billion (2011). The low rents in Alberta makes it 
possible to spend the derived revenue, as opposed to Norway, where the high rents 
necessitates government fund saving to avoid overheating the economy. This fact makes it 
possible to accommodate the public wish for both free enterprise and government spending 
in priority areas in Alberta. In Norway the wish for equality and unity is accommodated by 
high rents for the public good, however the large revenues make it impossible to spend all of 
it. Because the government evidently have funds available for public spending it apparently 
leads to a public wish for higher spending, which the government is unable to provide due to 
macroeconomic considerations (Vale 2007: 449). 
Despite this similarity of public wish for high natural resource revenue spending, the 
perceived cultural differences lead to different “wants” within the jurisdictions, which again 
lead to different policy outcomes. The Albertan wish for free enterprise and low government 
interference provide low incentives for government fund saving, whereas the Norwegian 
wish for equality provides an incentive for high government rents and subsequent 
government fund saving. It seems clear from this that the political cultures of Alberta and 
Norway shape the wants of its citizens and policymakers in distinctly different ways. 
Interestingly the two different approaches have led to approximately the same results on 
important economic indicators. This indicates that both liberal and coordinated economic 
policies can lead to a positive economic environment. Yet Alberta and Norway have chosen 
different paths in relation to fund saving. As argued above, this can be understood by the 
differences in political culture.  
53 
 
9 Political Institutional Structure 
This chapter will provide an overview of the political institutional structures of Alberta and 
Norway and an analysis of the implications these differences have on the dependent 
variable. Above it has been argued that political culture explains why Norway and Alberta 
differ in their policy choices concerning natural resource allocation, yet political institutional 
structure must also be expected to have an effect in this respect and should be accounted 
for (Pye 1968).  
In order to employ institutional structure as an independent explanatory variable it is 
necessary to discriminate it from other explanatory variables, and in this thesis to 
discriminate it from political culture. However, to differentiate political culture from political 
institutional structure is not a straightforward task:  
If the concept of political culture is to be effectively utilized, it needs to be supplemented with 
structural analysis, but the difficulty is that political structures can be seen on the one hand as 
products reflecting the political culture, while on the other hand they are also important ‘givens’ which 
shape the political culture. (Pye 1968: 224) 
Following Pye (1968) it is unclear whether culture reflects structure or the other way around. 
Yet, what seems clear from the statement above is that the two concepts affect each other, 
and that both should be accounted for in a political analysis. 
 Almond and Verba (1989: 32) claim that any polity can be described and compared 
with other polities by looking at its structural-functional characteristics and its cultural 
characteristics. They relate political structural patterns to political cultural tendencies and 
claim that this way the assumption of congruence between structure and culture can be 
avoided. “Rather than assuming congruence, we must ascertain the extent and character of 
the congruence or incongruence, and the trends in political cultural or structural 
development that may affect the ‘fit’ between culture and structure” (Almond and Verba 
1989: 33).  
The analysis below will, in addition to look at the independent role of political 
institutional structure, draw connections between cultural tendencies and structural 
patterns in an attempt to show that they “fit” each other. This, though, makes for difficulties 
in determining whether culture, structure, or both, are responsible for the differences in 
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outcome on the dependent variable. In an attempt to differentiate between political culture 
and political institutional structure this thesis employs a definition of political culture as the 
underlying context where values and norms, and subsequently wants, are shaped, while 
political institutional structure relates to the formal institutions concerning the relationship 
between policymakers, parties, and interest groups. These are related, as noted by Pye 
(1968), because they affect each other but are also distinguishable in the way noted.  
9.1 Operationalization 
According to Easton (1990: 62) political systems have many kinds of structures and these 
structures have implications on how political systems operate to produce the kind of policy 
output that they do. The most common usage of the term structure in political systems refer 
to the “the way power is organized and distributed among the political authorities and 
between them and the members of the political system as a whole. Structure here clearly 
refers to the stable patterns of power relationships among the major individual and 
collective actors in a political system” (Easton 1990: 64). Apter (1971: 21) contends that 
political structure refers to criteria in terms of which choices about the distribution of goods 
and benefits are made. Critical realists contend that the actions of social actors are a product 
of pre-existing structures (Lewis 2002). Of course pre-existing structures lack the capacity to 
initiate actions or to make things happen on its own, but it does affect the course of events 
in the social world by influencing the actions that people choose to undertake. Actors or 
agents are the only efficient causes in the world, however there are additional material 
causes such as structures, Lewis (2002) argues. Following the critical realist position, as 
presented, the structure of a political system in a particular jurisdiction becomes important 
in explaining why they produce similar or different policy outcomes.  
It is important to note that structure is conceptualized as the restraints and 
opportunities that political institutions provide, and that party and interest groups are the 
main components that will be utilized in the search for reasons behind the differences in 
policy outcome in the two cases. The forthcoming analysis will show that political 
institutional structures have an independent, however affected by political culture, effect on 
the policy outputs in Alberta and Norway.  
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9.2 Norwegian corporatism 
Norway is described as one of the most corporatist countries in the world by Schmitter 
(1979: 21). Lijphart (1999: 177) refers to Norway as one of the best examples of societal 
corporatism. Yet, Nordby (2004: 107) contends that pluralism is gaining the upper hand in 
Norway, and that organizations are fairly free to express and pursue their concerns through 
means such as lobbying. The state has lost considerable power relating to their societal 
control, as a result of this. Further evidence is found in Guldbransen et al. (2002: 226) and 
their survey of 2000 top leaders of Norwegian institutions and organizations. They find that, 
through their position, 71 percent of leaders (CEO’s, etc.) have attempted to influence public 
decisions with importance to their businesses activities. In a survey among Norwegian 
members of parliament conducted in 1995, 68 percent reported that they spoke weekly with 
business and industrial organizations, and 54 percent reported that they were addressed 
weekly by trade unions (Rommetvedt 2003: 159). These numbers represent a contrast to the 
acclaimed centralized organization of Norwegian politics. Accordingly, corporatist structures 
in Norway are not as dominant as they once were (Nordby 2004: 107), yet Norway is still 
comparatively corporatist related to similar countries. The corporatist representation has 
been partly replaced by the lobbyism seen in pluralism (Rommetvedt 2007: 53), although 
corporatist segments remain. Ingebritsen (2010: 363) contends that Katzenstein’s 
framework (described below) is still relevant when explaining the policy choices of small 
European states, and Christensen (2007) upholds that the system incorporates many 
different interests, but is nonetheless dominated by the major labor unions and employer’s 
unions due to their large resources and number of members. On that account democratic 
corporatism will be employed as a theoretical reference point on the political institutional 
structure in Norway.         
9.2.1 Global Economy 
In the 1970s inflation became the preeminent problem facing developed economies (Hall 
and Soskice (2001: 3), and from this an approach based on neo-corporatism was developed 
(see Berger 1981; Goldthorpe ed. 1984). The neo-corporatist approach is generally 
associated with a state’s capacity to bargain with employers and trade unions regarding 
wages, working conditions, and social or economic policy. Following this, a state’s capacity 
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for neo-corporatism depends on the centralization or concentration of the trade union 
movement (Hall and Soskice 2001: 3). An alternative approach to neo-corporatism has been 
developed by Katzenstein (1985) in Small States in World Markets, and according to 
Katzenstein (1985) small states respond differently to economic change, than their larger 
counterparts. 
Avoiding policies of protection and of structural transformation equally, they combine international 
liberalization with domestic compensation. The result is flexible policies of adjustment that, on 
questions of industrial policy, avoid both the indifference of some large states and the ambition of 
others (Katzenstein 1985: 39).  
However, the industrial policies pursued by small states differ among them with some taking 
a relatively active approach, and others a relatively passive approach. Yet, what they have in 
common is a goal of securing a liberal international economy, because domestic protection 
undermines the competitiveness in world markets, and the adoption of protectionist policies 
sets a bad precedent in domestic policies. Also, protectionism may lead to retaliation by 
larger and less vulnerable states (Katzenstein 1985: 40).  
For example Norway stand outside the EU, but is a part of the EEA. This allows 
Norway to participate in the EU’s internal market without a conventional EU membership90. 
In return, Norway is obliged to adopt all EU legislation related to the single market, except 
laws on agriculture and fisheries. According to the Norwegian government it is in Norway’s 
own interest to help reduce disparities between countries in the EEA, because an improved 
functioning of the internal market is to the benefit of Norway91. In a small country like 
Norway, it is imperative for the nation’s import and export industries to be part of the EEA as 
Norway is the EU’s fourth most important partner92. Accordingly since the position of small 
states is intrinsically weak, these states have an interest in lowering tariffs and strengthening 
multilateralism (Katzenstein 1985: 40). However, small states have occasionally formed their 
own trading unions e.g. the European Free Trade Area (EFTA)93, but these arrangements 
were constructed in a way as to not inhibit trade with the rest of the world (ibid.). It must be 
                                                 
90
 See the Agreement on the European Economic Area (12.08.12): http://efta.int/~/media/Documents/legal-
texts/eea/the-eea agreement/Main%20Text%20of%20the%20Agreement/EEAagreement.ashx 
91
 Norwegian government (12.08.12): http://www.regjeringen.no/en/sub/europaportalen/eea-
grants/qa_eeagrants.html?id=589010  
92
 European Commission (12.08.12): http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-
relations/countries/norway/ 
93
 EFTA official site (22.08.12): http://www.efta.int/free-trade.aspx 
57 
 
noted in this regard that Great Britain, which is hardly a small state, was part of EFTA from 
1960 until it left the union in 1973. Katzenstein (1985: 44) notes that the small states pursuit 
of economic liberalism is due to their awareness that political autonomy and economic 
prosperity are best served by a diffusion of dependence on a larger market, and that this is 
the preeminent way to protect and increase domestic welfare. This can in part explain the 
Norwegian authorities’ unwillingness to leave EU legislation unimplemented and away from 
national laws.   
As described above, the small European states are reliant on the international 
markets and thus promote international free trade. This liberal approach necessitates 
domestic compensation for vulnerable national economic actors, thus policies designed to 
provide compensation for instabilities in investment and employment are common in the 
small European states (Keohane 1984: 15). For example, during the sixties Norwegian 
businesses were allowed to deposit 20 percent of taxable profits in the Central Bank, to be 
invested in periods of slack demand. Other measures included vocational training programs, 
temporary employment, wage actions, and Norway statutory wage freezes as a response to 
the economic recession of the seventies. Today, these are the key bodies in the Norwegian 
industrial-policy system94: The Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development Fund: is a 
source of financing for small and medium sized companies, and is mainly focused on 
competence increasing measures and female participation. The Research Council of Norway: 
administers NOK 3 billion for research purposes and provides advice on research-policy 
matters, thus to increase the level of knowledge and promote creativity. The Norwegian 
Trade Council: is the national center of expertise on exports, internationalization, and 
technological collaboration. The Norwegian Guarantee Institute for Export Credits: is the 
main governmental body meant for providing and insuring export credits. This is to promote 
export of Norwegian goods and services and Norwegian investments abroad. These are 
examples of Norwegian policies aimed at protecting the domestic economy from 
international pressures. Further, and at the heart of the Norwegian approach of domestic 
compensation, as described below, are the system of collective bargaining, which was 
centralized in 1963, and a union of wage solidarity (Katzenstein 1985: 51). 
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Stephens (1979) notes that the small European states largely rely on their public 
sector as a critically important component in domestic compensation: 
Governments in nations with open economies have sought to counter the effects of external 
dependency by expanding their control over the domestic economy through the nationalization of a 
large portion of the national income (Stephens 1979: 20). 
Proof of this, as noted above, is seen in large public ownership shares in major corporations, 
such as Telenor, Hydro and Statoil. Tax levels on oil and gas production are also high in 
Norway, especially when compared to Alberta. The comparatively high tax levels and state 
ownership in major corporations provide a possibility for Norwegian politicians to carry out 
economic policies aimed at domestic protection against international pressures. Accordingly, 
the high levels of oil and gas rents provide a powerful means for domestic compensation. 
9.2.2 Democratic Corporatism 
An ideology of social partnership, which is a shared understanding by business and unions, is 
descriptive of the small states. Katzenstein (1985) calls this ideology democratic corporatism, 
and further claims that this is a distinctive feature of all the small European states. According 
to Rommetvedt (2002: 58), an important feature of corporatism is that decisions are made 
by equal partners. In Norway, the wage negotiations held bi-annually between the 
Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO)95 and the Confederation of Norwegian 
Enterprise (NHO)96 serves as an example of this (Røed Larsen 2004: 22). Yet, if the system is 
to be described as corporatist, it is necessary that the state has a role in the negotiations. 
The state can function as a mediator, or as a third party, in the negotiations (Rommetvedt 
2002: 59), which is in accordance with the neo-corporatism described by Berger (1981) and 
Goldthorpe (ed. 1984).  
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9.2.3 Values and Norms 
Rommetvedt (2002: 63) contends that the corporatist system of negotiations only can deal 
with issues relating to the distribution of economic goods etc. i.e. if the negotiating parts 
have different views concerning values and norms, the platforms are too different to lead to 
a compromise. In other words, the parties need similar preferences when it comes to values 
and norms, to lay the foundation for meaningful negotiations where a compromise can be 
reached. As mentioned above, Norwegian political culture is described by egalitarian 
individualism. The idea of equality, shared by multiple actors in the economy is imperative 
for the functioning of Norwegian corporatism, following Rommetvedt (2002). A common 
goal of securing relative equality within society is served by securing national workplaces 
and at the same time managing Norwegian businesses prospects of competing 
internationally, in a sound fashion. Eichengreen (1996: 46) points to a notion of a social 
contract when explaining Norwegian corporatism. The social contract involves labor unions 
agreeing to restrain wage demands in return for a pledge that profits will be invested back 
into capital formation. This bargain, between labor and capital instigated by the state, is 
embraced by labor unions because it promises higher future incomes and high employment. 
Industry consents because it is promised cheap credit and wage restraints (Esping-Andersen 
1985: 216-219). The state’s part in the negotiations, seen in corporatism with its centralized 
structure, assists its functioning by reminding the parts, laborers and employers, about how 
their preferences affect the aggregate economy and by promising favorable returns for both 
parts. Seen this way, the democratic corporatism experienced in Norway is intertwined with 
the cultural context of the country because functional corporatism necessitates common 
values and norms. The positive effects of the arrangement are visible on macroeconomic 
indicators, and in turn this legitimizes the system and the state’s role as a mediator. 
According to Hveem (1994: 33), the Norwegian corporatist system is characterized by a high 
ability to reach compromises and to divide economic costs and benefits. Arguably this is due 
to the common values and norms of equality and unity that allows the state an active part in 
the economy. 
There exists empirical numbers to back the notion of the acclaimed social contract. In 
the period between 1992 and 2011 Norway experienced 243 strikes, which is an average of 
12 per year. The average rises to 18 per year when only measuring the years of the main 
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wage negotiations, but shows only 6 per year when measuring the year’s in-between97. 
According to Røed Larsen (2004: 21) laborers appear satisfied with the visible economic 
growth, because they know that eventual profits will be plowed back into growth, and this 
has led to relatively few work stoppages in Norway.  
Table 10 
 
The numbers presented in table 10 are found in Lund, Frisvold, and Kalgraff Skjåk’s (1999)98 
national survey about social inequality. The survey provides a picture of low levels of 
conflicts between management and laborers in Norwegian workplaces, and underlines Røed 
Larsen’s (2004) observation of satisfied laborers.  
9.2.4 Centralization of Interest Groups and the Labor Party 
There are strong and persistent connections between interest groups and political parties in 
the small European states (Katzenstein 1985: 89). In Norway this is exemplified by the strong 
connections between the Labor Party and LO. LO represents a large base of Labor Party 
voters and thus their views are listened to. Further, LO contributes with NOK 5 million 
(approximately C$1 million) to the Labor party each year99, and this helps cement the 
connection between the two parts. As mentioned previously, the Labor Party has been in 
governing position for 28 years since 1971, and Labor Party policies are typically geared 
toward a close relationship between the state and the economy (Nordby 1993: 7).  
Esping-Andersen (1985: 216) notes that the Labor Party was in great shape for the 
promotion of their industrial policies including the state as an active agent in the process, 
due to the national solidarity stemming from World War II and their subsequent majorities 
in parliament. Postwar reconstruction in Norway involved extensive state regulation and 
controls, and the combination of detailed microeconomic and general macroeconomic 
planning were prevailing and persistent. The Labor Party was partly able to promote state-
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controlled industrial accumulation because the political resistance was nullified (Esping-
Andersen 1985: 217) but also, as mentioned above, because the policies were accepted by 
labor unions, even though it called for wage and consumption restraints. Capitalists similarly 
welcomed the program because it offered wage restraints and access to cheap credit. The 
primary sector embraced the program due to considerable income compensation and price 
subsidies. Finally, the package of controls and planning relies on the willingness of LO and 
NHO to abide by the Public Wage Board’s guidelines, i.e. when negotiations between capital 
and labor fail to result in a settlement a forced wage council is set in motion (Esping-
Andersen 1985: 218).  
Following this, the Labor Party had a central role in the establishment of Norwegian 
corporatism. Further, the Labor Party argues that redistribution of wealth is about equality 
and fairness, and that the Norwegian economy is hallmarked by high economic growth 
combined with equal distribution of earnings100. It seems like their close affiliation with the 
political culture of egalitarian individualism combined with the national solidarity coming 
from World War II made it possible for the Labor Party to gain a majority in parliament and 
thereafter carry out their economic policies through the implementation of corporatist 
institutions.  
9.2.5 Why Democratic Corporatism Leads to Fund Saving 
In the above sections it has been argued that small European states take measures to ensure 
domestic compensation against international pressures, and that Norway, as a small state, is 
dependent on world and regional markets for economic growth. Norway is therefore 
proponents of international free trade, as noted by the Norwegian government101. Larger, 
and economically less vulnerable states may not be as dependent on world markets as the 
smaller states. To counter this, the smaller states have developed a system of corporatism 
for domestic protection. At the heart of Norwegian corporatism are the major wage 
negotiations facilitated and overlooked by the state, and the possibility for the state to 
engage in forced wages council.  
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In order for the Norwegian authorities to be able to maintain this system the 
establishment of a government owned savings fund for natural resource revenues is 
important. If the capital coming from oil and gas production were to be handled to a larger 
extent by the market, like in Alberta, the state would lose control over where the revenue is 
located. A consequence of this would be less revenue available for government administered 
bodies and schemes meant for the promotion of economic diversification and the promotion 
of international trade of Norwegian products. Due to the Norwegian economy’s reliance on 
foreign markets, combined with Norway’s relatively small size, these government programs 
are important for domestic protection against exogenous pressures. Obviously the large 
government owned oil fund provides the Norwegian government with a powerful means to 
counter the possible negative economic effects, as described. Thus the institutions found in 
Norwegian corporatism provide an incentive for government-facilitated fund saving, because 
the savings are important for the protection of Norwegian businesses competing abroad in 
foreign markets. 
Another important institution in the corporatism seen in Norway is the government 
facilitated main wage negotiations. This system necessitates common values and norms, as 
argued above, but clear ownership to oil and gas revenue is also important because it helps 
evading large scale conflict between laborers and employers (Tsui 2005). Without control 
over the vast resource revenues the possibility to encourage and instigate sobriety for both 
parts in wage negotiations will be thwarted, and hence an important fundament of the 
corporatism seen in Norway would be weakened. To illustrate this, resource curse theory 
will be applied.   
Rent seeking and purchase of political power are examples of negative effects viable 
in resource-endowed societies. Karl (1997) mentions overly centralized political power; 
strong networks of complicity between public and private sector actors; the replacement of 
domestic tax revenues and other sources of earned income by petrodollars, as typical 
features of rent seeking. According to Smith (2004) oil wealth creates weak state-society 
linkages, because the state does not need to represent social groups for the purpose of 
taxation or to develop public policies to justify the level of taxation. Accordingly, with 
ownership of a large oil and gas fund the Norwegian government is in a position where it 
potentially is able to spend oil and gas revenue to maintain power. Røed Larsen (2004: 20) 
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identifies two resource curse factors relevant to the question of government administered 
fund saving.  They are large-scale conflicts that are typically prolonged work stoppages or 
lockouts; and the purchase of political power where incumbent politicians promise paybacks 
in return for votes often referred to as clientelism. Norway has largely been shielded from 
these effects and this thesis argues that the democratic corporatist institutions are 
important reasons for this.   
To avoid large-scale conflicts over distribution, clear ownership of large resource 
revenue is imperative, according to Tsui (2005). Thus keeping the vast oil and gas revenues 
in an abroad government owned savings fund largely takes away possible conflicts over 
distribution of oil revenue, and hence makes for a stable economic environment. Following 
the notion that democratic corporatism is a response to the pressures of the liberal global 
market, the establishment of a petroleum fund helps strengthen government influence on 
the domestic economy because it forms clear ownership rights to the revenue, and this 
diminishes the risk of rent-seeking on behalf of the oil producing companies, and the risk of 
revenue flowing abroad. As noted previously, a budgetary rule that ideally allows a 
maximum of 4 percent of net revenue to be taken from the fund each year has been 
implemented, and in effect this restrains the day-to-day access of the revenue for 
policymakers. As a result, this removes the possibility for interest groups to bargain over 
larger rents, and additionally, it largely eliminates the possibilities for politicians to promise 
certain interest groups larger rents. Without the high rents on oil and gas production 
combined with the state owned oil and gas fund, a larger share of the revenue coming from 
oil and gas production would be left to the market. With higher returns for the oil 
companies, laborers would soon be expected to demand higher wages. Higher wages would 
instigate a transfer of labor to the resource industry, which in turn will have the likely effect 
of hurting other Norwegian industries. Dutch disease theory describes this chain of 
events102. Following this, the government owned oil and gas fund is a necessary component 
for the upholding of democratic corporatism, because the government owned oil and gas 
fund is a prerequisite for the state to be able to instigate sobriety in wage negotiations. In 
other words the government owned oil and gas fund diminishes the risk of labor conflicts, 
because the revenue is effectively taken away from wage negotiations. By referring to the 
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empirical numbers presented previously Norway has been shielded from larger work 
conflicts, which implies that the goal of wage moderation on both parts has been met.         
The second factor mentioned by Røed Larsen (2004) points to the interplay between 
economics and how the election system works. With government control over massive 
resource wealth it is possible for politicians to promise rewards in return for re-election. This 
practice of clientelism erodes the fundaments of democracy as incumbent politicians are in a 
position to spend, or promise to spend, money on projects in an effort to gain an advantage 
over political opposition. Opposition politicians aiming for government control may also 
make promises. This can lead to a rush of promises eroding the resistance to overspending 
of resource revenues. In Norway Karl (1997) and Tsui (2005) mention the establishment of 
the government owned petroleum fund as an important feature that debilitates the 
possibilities for political clientelism, because the oil fund regulations take away excess oil 
revenues from the day-to-day control of policymakers. Further, the guiding principle of the 
budgetary rule of 4 percent largely removes the possibilities for politicians to promise larger 
spending of oil revenue than 4 percent, as mentioned above. It can thus be argued that the 
establishment of the Government Pension Fund Global combined with the 4 percent 
budgetary rule has mitigated the chances of a resource curse occurrence in Norway, and as 
we shall see, Alberta with its more fragmented pluralist structure, has not been shielded 
from the resource curse to the same degree as Norway. In short, the establishment of the oil 
fund and the application of the 4 percent rule form the fundament of democratic 
corporatism in Norway because these features help facilitate the centralized wage 
bargaining system in ways described above. These features are also pertinent means for 
domestic compensation and subsequently resource curse escape.  
9.2.6 Market System 
The chapters about market system for both Norway and Alberta have been added to show 
that it may be economically rational for the two to implement the economic policies that 
they do. 
To reiterate the variables presented earlier, Alberta and Norway display similar 
numbers on a range of independent variables. The population is about the same, oil 
production is about the same, GDP/total and GDP/cap are about the same, unemployment 
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rates are about the same, and inflation rates for the last twenty years are about the same. 
The two jurisdictions also have ownership to natural resources that are found on their 
territory. First and foremost these numbers show that both Norway and Alberta are 
economically successful. Where Sweden, Denmark and the rest of the EU struggle with an 
average unemployment rate of 11.2 percent103, Norway displays a rate of 3.2 percent. 
Alberta’s unemployment numbers currently show 5.5 percent, which is comparatively low to 
the Canadian average of 7.2 percent104 and the US average of 8.2 percent105. When looking 
at the numbers of GDP growth Norway displays an average GDP growth between 1990 and 
2010 of 2.6 percent, which is equal to the average growth seen in the EU106. Canada shows 
an average growth in the same period of 2.5 percent, which is equal to the numbers seen in 
the US107. Alberta however displays an average of 3.4 percent108. Apparently Norway, 
Canada, the US and the EU have experienced approximately the same growth rates over the 
last 20 years, but Alberta stands out with a 1 percent higher average growth during the same 
period. In combination the numbers of unemployment and GDP growth tell a positive story 
of Alberta and Norway compared to similar jurisdictions.  
Hall and Soskice (2001) highlight the importance of firms and the role of business in 
political economy, however without neglecting the significance of trade unions, in their 
varieties of capitalism approach. The core distinction drawn by Hall and Soskice (2001) is 
between liberal market economies and coordinated market economies. The varieties of 
capitalism approach is particularly suited to compare different kinds of economies, such as 
the Norwegian economy which falls under the coordinated market economy, and the 
Albertan economy which is best described as a liberal market economy.  
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In coordinated market economies firms depend on non-market relationships to 
coordinate their activities with other actors in order to construct their core competencies. 
This entails a larger reliance on collaborative, rather than competitive relationships between 
firms (Hall and Soskice 2001: 8). Accordingly, policymakers who secure adequate forms of 
coordination among actors can improve national economic performance. In Norway this 
coordination is exemplified by the state’s role in the main wage negotiations. Effective 
strategic cooperation habitually depends on the presence of appropriately organized social 
organizations, e.g. LO and NHO, that states can encourage but not create (ibid.).
 Governments of coordinated market economies take advantage of strong business 
associations and trade unions to deal with problems of information asymmetries and high 
transaction costs. Because the associations and unions are independent of the government, 
economic actors are more inclined to trust them with private information to effectively 
administer coordination-oriented policies. Given this, Hall and Soskice (2001: 48) argue that 
coordinated policies are more likely to succeed in states with both a coordinated market 
economy and a political system where producer groups enjoy substantial structural 
influence, as in Norwegian democratic corporatism. Egalitarian individualism and democratic 
corporatism, combined with the coordinated market policies of the Norwegian Labor Party, 
lay the foundation for a coordinated market system. In this market system interest groups 
are unionized in major centralized unions, unlike the fragmented environment seen in 
Alberta. Therefore, according to Hall and Soskice the Norwegian authorities should focus on 
policies aimed at inducing non-market coordination between economic actors rather than 
attempting to sharpen market competition through tax rebates, as seen in Alberta. If the 
goal is to maximize economic growth, then the rational policy option within the jurisdiction 
is to extract high levels of rent for fund saving, in combination with a coordinated effort by 
the state to induce union collaboration. It is not a practical choice for the Norwegian 
authorities to lower taxes and reduce fund saving as seen in Alberta, following Hall and 
Soskice. As mentioned above, Katzenstein (1985) and Keohane (1984) contend that the 
authorities of small states coordinate action between market actors as protection against 
international pressures. The rational choice to obtain this protection is establishing clear 
ownership rights of resource revenue to avoid conflicts over distribution and to induce trade 
union cooperation in coherence with democratic corporatism. Hence the rational economic 
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choice, which has proven effective for Norway on indicators such as employment, inflation 
(CPI), and GDP/cap/total, is the establishment of a state owned petroleum fund because it 
helps facilitate the corporatist institutions, as described above.  
9.3 Albertan Neo-Pluralism 
Norwegian politics can be understood by the concept of democratic corporatism, as 
described previously. Canadian politics are less centralized and hence the notion of 
democratic corporatism does not apply. Pluralism is the idea that individual interest groups 
exert pressure on the government and parliament through lobbying to have their wants 
realized. It is characterized by a low degree of unions in policymaking, and the pressure 
groups are often fragmented competing for different interests (Smith 1990). According to 
Lehmbruch (1984:66) Canadian politics can be classified as pluralist, thus displaying a low 
degree of corporatism. Following the notion of pluralism interest groups wield significant 
amounts of power and are therefore important in determining policy outcomes. However 
importantly, a free flow of ideas and groups cannot be expected to have influence on the 
policymakers, hence all groups do not have equal access to power (Smith 1990), i.e. business 
and economic interests hold a favored position in exercising pressure on policymakers. Neo-
pluralism was developed with the recognition that business holds a superior position to 
other groups (Dunleavy and O’Leary 1987: 275). Following the neo-pluralist position it can be 
acknowledged that corporate units of businesses exercise great power, and consequently, 
business interests control significant parts of government.  
Lindblom (1977) argues that business holds an advantage by two factors: the 
government needs to give business inducements in order to make sure the economy is 
successful. In turn this puts business in a favorable position. Secondly, important decisions 
are taken by businesses in a market system and are thus taken away from the government 
agenda. Consequently, decisions that affect many people’s lives are removed from 
democratic control. The government adopts measures that are in the interest of business 
because the government needs a healthy economy (Smith 1990). Corporations, in their 
relations with governments, unsurprisingly fully exploit their discretionary power, described 
by Lindblom, to commit or hold back resources, to make investments, and to hire or lay off 
workers, etc. Because industry resources hold such significance in liberal democracies, and 
68 
 
because employment and output decisions render very directly into electoral popularity, 
governments always act with special regard to business interests (Dunleavy and O’Leary 
1987: 294).  
There are however some uncertainties with the neo-pluralist stance as presented by 
Lindblom. First, it is unclear how business exercises its influence on policymaking it 
disapproves of. Second, there will presumably always be examples of groups, other than 
business, receiving benefits. Despite these problems, Smith (1990) argues that Lindblom’s 
position is useful in many respects because it recognizes that there are differences between 
interest groups, and that it allows for a role of ideology in policy-making. Following this, 
Lindblom acknowledges that consensus is not necessarily the result of agreement but of 
manipulation of preferences (Smith 1990).  
9.3.1 Neo-Pluralism and the Alberta Progressive Conservatives 
As mentioned previously the typical conservative party is concerned with personal liberty 
and free enterprise, and the Alberta PC government is no exception. In their statement of 
principles they declare that the creation of wealth and jobs can be best achieved by a free 
enterprise economy, and that their fiscal priorities include the minimizing of taxes109. These 
principles are coherent with the notions inherent in the political culture of Alberta, 
presented in chapter 8.3 Alberta: Political Culture, but they also sustain the features of neo-
pluralism:  
In addition to the low tax and royalty policies subsequent Conservative governments 
have been hostile to labor union organization. In the eighties a Labor Relations Code (Bill 22) 
was introduced in Alberta. Bill 22 requires unions to have signed up at least 40 percent of a 
bargaining unit’s members, and unions have to win a representation vote by 50 percent plus 
another vote to obtain certification (Reshef 1990). According to Reshef (1990) Bill 22 
improves employers’ ability to obstruct union organizing. In Gibbins’ 1979 study, 83.3 
percent of the asked Albertans answered that trade unions had become too powerful in 
Canada. Apparently the union hostile policies of the Alberta PC government have public 
backing. Additionally, Statistics Canada reports that Alberta has the lowest number of 
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unionized laborers of all the provinces in Canada110, and that union membership is on the 
decline in the province111. These facts resonate well with the notion of neo-pluralism where 
business is expected to hold an advantageous position over other interest groups. 
9.3.2 Economic Diversification 
Even though the general government interference in the economy is low in Alberta, there 
exist some programs for economic diversification. The most important initiatives highlighted 
by the government of Alberta are112: Regional Economic Development Alliances (REDA), 
which is a non-profit organization working toward business development and prosperity in a 
defined geographic area. REDA is supported by the Alberta government to help people 
undertake business projects. Community Economic Development is a program that supports 
people in developing and implementing economic development plans. Rural Alberta 
Business Centers (RABC), is a partnership program between the Alberta Government and 
local organizations. It provides advice and information to entrepreneurs and small 
businesses to assist them in making informed business decisions. 
 These programs show that the Alberta government is concerned with economic 
diversification and promotes initiatives to make this happen. Here Alberta correlates with 
Norway that also has economic diversification as one of its priorities. It seems, though, that 
the Alberta programs mainly are civil initiatives that receive government support after 
establishment. In Norway the diversification programs are in a larger degree government 
initiatives from the beginning of the process113.  
 An important point in this regard is the availability of government funds to support 
such diversification programs. Despite Alberta’s vast natural resource reserves the province 
has over the last three years been running deficits114. Obviously, with higher rents for the 
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operating oil and gas companies more revenue would be available for the government. This 
revenue could, amongst other things, have been spent on diversification programs115.    
9.3.3 The Applicability of Lindblom’s Thesis   
The oil and gas producing industry meets a business friendly environment in Alberta due to 
the comparatively low levels of taxes and royalties, as presented previously. It thus seems 
like the Alberta government is concentrated on incentivizing business to produce maximum 
output by liberal economic means rather than focusing on high rents and fund saving, as 
stated by the PC political platform mentioned in chapter 8.3.3 Political Rule/Government. 
This has helped Alberta grow to become the largest economy in Canada referring to the 
numbers presented above, but it has also hampered government-facilitated accumulation of 
funds. In other words, if the Alberta government were to extract larger amounts of revenue 
from the market through taxes and royalties corporations would be left in a weaker position 
vis-à-vis exogenous competition. According to the neo-pluralist position, this is exactly why 
governments in capitalist societies keep business happy with low tax rates, because it is 
perceived as the only option to instigate economic growth and create work places.  
Following the views held by Lindblom (1982) the structure may be difficult to break. 
In his article “The Market as Prison” he argues that the fundamental structures of capitalism 
are challenging to alter because they have been institutionalized as laws of nature. 
Accordingly, to change the way Alberta handles it natural resource wealth necessitates 
thinking outside the box. Keeping the features of western alienation fresh in mind, the 
liberal policies in Alberta can be expected to die-hard. With so many fundamental factors 
pointing in the direction seen today, e.g. public support of the arrangements through 
surveys and liberal PC government policies, it seems unlikely that low royalty rates will yield 
increased savings anytime soon. As mentioned above, Lindblom (1977) contends that 
policymakers are forced to go with the market forces because not doing so could lead to 
downsizing of production and thus workplaces will be lost in the process. This, however, is 
due to the institutional structure of neo-pluralism. Norway, in comparison, extracts six times 
the rent from the oil and gas industry than Alberta does. Referring to the variables 
presented in the introductory chapter, Norway and Alberta display similar numbers on 
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important economic variables. Hence low royalty and tax rates are not necessarily a 
prerequisite for a prosperous economy. Accordingly, a break out of the market as prison is 
viable under certain circumstances. In Alberta, however, with its current PC government 
backed by the notions of western alienation, going from low levels of fund savings to more 
extensive levels seems far-fetched.  
As shown earlier, the democratic corporatism seen in Norway necessitates common 
values and norms, for example about how revenue is to be shared between corporate 
owners and labor. Common values and norms can also be found in the case of Alberta where 
multiple societal actors share in the general views of free enterprise and low tax levels. By 
referring to the public surveys and PC policies Alberta is as homogenous in their wish for low 
taxes and free enterprise, as Norway arguably is for equality and unity. Following this, it is 
possible to imagine that trade unions in Alberta would come together in major wage 
negotiations on these terms. Yet government distrust is a central feature of western 
alienation, and this hampers the prospects of implementation of a corporatist system. The 
state needs to have a central role in the negotiations if the arrangement is to be defined as 
corporatist, as described in chapter 9.2.2 Democratic Corporatism. It seems unlikely that 
Alberta business and labor would allow for the arbiter role of the state seen in Norway, 
including the right of the state to engage in forced wage councils. Obviously the features of 
democratic corporatism contradict the “Alberta right to free enterprise” at a fundamental 
level. As a result, a denser Alberta government involvement in the economy is unwanted. 
Consequently the Alberta government is forced, and presumably also wishes to leave the 
economy rolling by itself with low levels of interference. Understandably, the low levels of 
rent, related to the wish for free enterprise combined with government distrust, create a 
structure that leads to diminishing incentives for fund saving.  
9.3.4 Resource Curse Experience in Alberta 
When the experiences in Alberta are assessed in relation to the resource curse hypothesis, 
the picture changes from what is seen in Norway. Previously it was argued that a corporatist 
system could be viable in Alberta due to the close connections between government policies 
and political culture. For that reason it may be hypothesized that the close connection 
between political culture and political structure mitigates the incidence of large-scale 
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conflicts over resources and revenue in Alberta because the public is satisfied with the way 
the economy is organized.  
The average number of work stoppages in Alberta in the period between 1990 and 
2011 is 7 per year116. The average number (number of work stoppages divided by number of 
provinces and territories) in Canada during the same time period is 23117. The numbers show 
that Alberta comparatively to the rest of Canada has been shielded from high numbers of 
work stoppages. The relative hostility of Alberta’s government toward labor unionizing must 
be expected to have an effect on the number of strikes. Nonetheless, working Albertans 
have the possibility to engage in strikes, thus arguably one of the reasons why Alberta has 
escaped the resource curse of large-scale conflicts, is by sporting close connections between 
political culture and political institutional structure in coherence with Eichengreen’s (1996) 
theory of social contract. Evidently, referring to the numbers above, both Norway and 
Alberta have avoided the resource curse effects of large-scale conflicts even though the 
economies are organized differently with regard to state interference.  
However, some evidence is seen of purchase of political power in Alberta. In 2004, 
Alberta Premier Ralph Klein handed out C$400 oil and gas revenue prosperity cheques to the 
electorate (Nikiforuk 2008: 158), and obviously this is a popular way of redistributing oil and 
gas revenue (Shaxson 2007). The total cost for the government accumulated to C$1.4 billion. 
This stunt by Premier Klein resembles the features of clientelism, and received strong 
criticism from the opposition118. According to the Alberta Liberals the prosperity cheques 
impeded the democratic process in the province. It can be argued that the cheques were 
merely liberal economic policy by leaving the revenue to be handled by individuals rather 
than by the government. This can be rationalized by arguing that the market knows best 
how to invest the C$1.4 billion. The opposition, however, saw this as an attempt of political 
purchase of power. Supporting the clientelistic view, Goldberg et al. (2008) find substantial 
evidence for the rentier-state hypothesis whereby mineral rents are used by incumbent 
politicians to purchase political support in their cross-national study of the US. These 
findings arguably fortify the Alberta opposition’s fear that the prosperity cheques handed 
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out by the ruling PC government were an attempt to buy votes. Further, Karl (1999: 37) 
notes that economic and political authority in rentier-states rest on the dual capacity to 
extract rents, and then to distribute the revenue using political criteria as the central 
mechanism of allocation. This creates close linkages between economic and political power 
that arguably are fortified by arrangements like the “Ralph bucks”119. Nevertheless, the 
notion of western alienation seen in Alberta inherits resentment to government and this 
resentment is found in the PC small government free enterprise policies. Consequently, the 
option of sharing the excess oil revenue with the public via cheques corresponds well with 
the view of western alienation. In short, the lack of provincial savings seen in Alberta, as a 
consequence of the PC’s economic liberal policies, forms the foundation for possible 
purchase of political power and thus makes the province disposed to the resource curse, 
because the lack of a functional provincial savings fund and budgetary rule provide 
politicians with extensive autonomy with regard to how the revenue may be handled cf. 
“Ralph bucks”.  
9.3.5 Connections between Business and Politics in Alberta  
There are close connections between public officials and private economic actors in Alberta, 
according to Nikiforuk (2008: 158). He argues that the distinctions between the business of 
oil and public affairs have diminished in the province, by pointing to the fact that former 
Premier Klein took a paid senior adviser job in the oil industry for Borden Ladner Gervais 
LLP120 after retiring from politics. In addition to this, Klein’s former chief of staff, Peter 
Elzinga, went from Klein’s office to work for the tar sands giant Suncor as a lobbyist, only to 
get back into politics as the executive director of Alberta’s PC nine months later. Former 
Alberta Energy Minister Greg Melchin joined the board of an oil company only three months 
after quitting politics; while the former minister of economic development, Mark Norris, was 
appointed chairman of Wescorp Energy Inc. These are only a few examples of connections 
between business and politics in Alberta, thus to strengthen the argument about the alleged 
networks, more elaborate numbers on the matter are required. It is nevertheless possible to 
assume that the connections, as presented, are helpful for the oil businesses when 
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bargaining with the Alberta government. The connections may not be illegal, but they 
nevertheless create close linkages between government and the oil business that may be 
beneficial to the oil industry when negotiating rents, and the other way around, they may be 
beneficial for politicians aiming for re-election. As mentioned above, Karl (1997: 193) 
contends that strong networks of complicity between public and private sector actors may 
lead to unfavorable rent seeking. Accordingly, the connection between business and 
politicians seen in Alberta could lead to a type of rent seeking perceived as a feature of the 
resource curse. Arguably, the features seen in Norway presented above are lacking in 
Alberta due to the institutional structure of neo-pluralism, where business is situated in a 
favorable position. A plausible consequence of the close connections between the oil 
companies and the provincial authorities, where actors rapidly change between positions in 
the oil business and the government, is that they debilitate the prospects of larger rent 
extraction on behalf of the government. Additionally, it makes Alberta liable to the resource 
curse effect of rent seeking, because oil and gas rents are low and renewed savings schemes 
to AHSF are absent.  
Further, Røed Larsen (2004) contends that transparency and media attention are of 
vital importance for avoidance of rent seeking. In Alberta the PC government made it legal 
for petro-politicians to lock away internal audits for fifteen years and for government 
ministers to keep their briefing binders out of public view for five years (Nikiforuk 2008: 
159). Tsalik (2003: 27) notes that the operations of the AHSF are subordinated to the 
governor’s cabinet and hence is part of the political process. The administrators of AHSF 
have an interest in shielding themselves from criticism from the legislature, and as a 
consequence of this the information to the public is limited. Audits are conducted by a 
provincial auditor, and not by an outside independent agency, as is the case in Norway. This 
contradicts the virtues of transparency and monitoring of public agencies as a means to help 
prevent occurrence of the curse. Subsequently and following Karl (1999: 45), the low degree 
of transparency of internal government audits in Alberta is a sign of a looming resource 
curse. It can be questioned whether the connections between politicians and the oil 
business explain the necessity of hiding internal government audits for fifteen years? These 
facts nonetheless strengthen the notion of neo-pluralism where business holds a favored 
position over other groups and that Alberta may be described by the concept. The close 
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connections between government and oil business arguably help explain why oil rents are 
low in Alberta and why subsequent government fund savings are lacking, as potential royalty 
revenue is left in the market at the hands of business.  
9.3.6 Market System 
In liberal market economies the equilibrium outcomes are usually given by supply and 
demand, whereas in coordinated market economies it rests more often on the strategic 
interaction between firms (Hall and Soskice 2001: 8). The principal problem facing 
policymakers is how to induce economic actors to better cooperate, following the view that 
the economy is an arena consisting of multiple actors. When actors coordinate better, e.g. 
trade unions and employers, their performance will be equally better. Accordingly, 
policymakers who secure adequate forms of coordination among actors can improve 
national economic performance. Also markets can secure this coordination, thus the task for 
the policymakers is to enhance the functions of the market (Hall and Soskice 2001: 45). A 
pertinent example in Alberta is the low-tax policy intended for long-term economic benefits, 
and the 1997 Generic Royalty Regime as previously presented. In 2012 the combined 
federal/provincial corporate income tax rate is set to 25 percent, which is a 1.5 percent 
reduction from 2011. Further, Alberta has no provincial capital tax, no payroll taxes, and no 
sales taxes121, which exemplifies the Alberta government’s liberal polices intended to 
enhance the position of the corporations within its jurisdiction.  
Culpepper (2001) describes the task facing policymakers as securing ‘decentralized 
cooperation’, which involves encouraging private-sector actors to share information, 
improving their ability to make credible commitments, and altering their expectations about 
what others will do. According to Hall and Soskice (2001: 46) states cannot tell economic 
actors what to do because the outcomes are too complex to be dictated by regulation and 
because states often lack the needed information to specify appropriate strategies. 
Following this, in liberal market economies, such as Alberta, better economic performance 
may demand policies that sharpen market competition, while in coordinated market 
economies, as in Norway, policies that reinforce the capacities of actors for non-market 
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coordination may be beneficial (Hall and Soskice 2001: 46). Accordingly, in Alberta the 
government is more likely to enhance economic activity by lowering taxes and by expanding 
formal education and research and development, rather than by trying to foster a 
Norwegian corporatist model. 
The Varieties of capitalism approach has been applied to show that the policy option 
of low rents and little fund saving chosen by Alberta have an economic rationale to it. 
Alberta is best defined as a liberal market system with its low taxes and low degree of labor 
unionizing. Market sharpening policies, like low taxes and royalty rates, are therefore better 
economic polices than attempting to foster a corporatist model. From this it may be argued 
that the rational economic choice, which has proven effective for Alberta on indicators such 
as employment, inflation (CPI), and GDP/cap/total, debilitates the prospects of significant 
fund saving due to the low tax and low royalty environment seen in the province.   
9.4 Structure as an Explanatory Variable 
Political systems are composed of a variety of structures, and these structures are formed by 
such elements as interest groups, formal government arrangements, etc. It is a common 
assumption that these structures determine the way a political system works, thus structure 
provides a frame and a degree of durability to the way social units work (Easton 1990: 30-
39). In Alberta interest groups are fragmented when working with policymakers. This has led 
to low royalty rates, as the government needs businesses to be successful in order to secure 
jobs and economic growth. In Norway interest groups show a higher degree of collaboration 
when bargaining with each other and the state. This system is a result of international 
economic pressures and the need for domestic compensation.  
Independently of our wishes we are born into a political system in which our relationships with others 
are regulated by certain rules. These relationships define part of the constraints under which we may 
act. They may also give us the opportunity to modify or change the rules substantially or even 
completely and, thereby, the nature of the pattern of relationships to others in which we may engage 
(Easton 1990: 53). 
 
Following Easton, political structures function as constraints on what we can and cannot do. 
Accordingly, the institutional structural environment of Alberta and Norway provide 
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constraints on viable actions for economic actors in the two jurisdictions. Previously it was 
noted that critical realists see agents as the only efficient causes in society, yet that 
structures influence the actions individuals choose to carry out. In other words, agents make 
their own decisions but not under the conditions of their own choosing. Sibeon (1999) claims 
that structures are material causes and that it is possible to ascribe causal efficacy to 
structures and still avoid the danger of ‘reification’. By ‘reification’ Sibeon (1999) means 
ascribing decision-making capacity to objects that are not actors. According to Lewis (2002) 
the contention that structures are material causes does not suggest reification, because 
material causality operates only through the decisions of actors. This way, the ontological 
distinction between actors and structure, as defined by critical realists (see chapter 9.1 
Operationalization), makes it possible to argue that the two possesses very different 
properties (Bhaskar 1989: 35 in Lewis 2002). Accordingly, structures have, as do actors, their 
own distinctive property of material causality (Lewis 2002), and this material causality is 
related to how structures influence the actions actors choose to undertake. 
9.5 Summary, Comparison and Findings 
Political institutional structure is an important explanatory variable because it provides 
possibilities and constraints to the choices actors may carry through. This way political 
institutional structure makes certain policy options more available than others. The Albertan 
political institutional structure, as described above, is characterized by low government 
interference in the economy that in turn leaves great decision autonomy to the market. The 
Norwegian political institutional structure is to a greater extent characterized by government 
intervention. For example does the state facilitate major wage negotiations and has the 
possibility to engage in forced wages council, if the negotiating parts are unable to reach an 
agreement. It is also noteworthy that the Norwegian government keeps large ownership 
shares in major corporations such as Statoil and Telenor. 
This thesis argues that the perceived differences have actual political implications 
which can be seen on the dissimilarities in policy outcomes in Alberta and Norway, and when 
viewed in light of critical realism, that it is possible to ascribe the two different structures of 
neo-pluralism and democratic corporatism material causality. The Albertan political 
institutional structure makes for low rents and little fund saving because government 
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interference is low. Additionally the institutional structure seems to lead to a higher degree 
of rent seeking on behalf of the oil producing companies, than what is experienced in 
Norway. Naturally, when the rents primarily end up in private businesses, less revenue is 
available for government fund saving. Norway sees a lower degree of rent seeking by the oil 
producing companies, because government taxes on production are comparatively high and 
the subsequent revenue is stored in a government owned savings fund. This thesis argues 
that a government owned oil fund is a prerequisite for the corporatism in Norway, because 
the centralized structure and need for domestic compensation makes government control of 
funds imperative for the upholding of the corporatist institutions, as described above. 
Both cases maintain programs for the promotion of economic diversification. Norway, with 
its comparatively high rents on production and large government savings fund, is however 
situated in a better position than Alberta when it comes to the prospects of offering funding 
for such schemes. Alberta has in later years run deficits, despite the large natural resource 
reserves, and this obviously debilitates the government’s possibility to have an economic 
impact on the economy by spending on programs.  
The chapters about market systems were added to provide an economic rationale to 
the different choices in Alberta and Norway. The numbers provided show that both 
jurisdictions have fared well economically, yet with essentially different policy outcomes on 
the dependent variable. Following Hall and Soskice (2001), the fragmented structure of 
Alberta and the centralized structure of Norway requires different policies if the aim is to 
maximize economic growth. Accordingly, low taxes and royalty rates is the superior policy 
option in Alberta, and opposite, a government facilitated system reliant on the economic 
actors willingness to abide by government regulations, is preferable in Norway.  
The differences presented above apparently produce prosperous economies, yet the 
institutions inherent in democratic corporatism produce a greater incentive for government 
fund saving than the neo-pluralism seen in Alberta.    
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10 Dutch Disease 
So far it has been argued that Alberta and Norway differ in their choices concerning resource 
revenue allocation due to differences in political culture and political system. Both models 
have produced prosperous economies, yet Alberta has not been as successful as Norway in 
terms of resource curse avoidance. As argued above, this is also closely connected to 
differences seen in political culture and structure. Another feature that will be added to the 
analysis is Dutch disease theory to investigate in what degree Alberta and Norway are 
susceptible to its features. Corden and Neary (1982) point to the factor movement effect and 
the spending effect, when explaining the Dutch disease.  
The factor movement effect is caused by attractive favorable returns in resource 
extraction and this leads to a transfer of capital and labor to resource extraction industries 
from other sectors. In the process, factor prices, e.g. wages increase. With increasing factor 
prices other sectors lose competitiveness, and hence diminish. The fiscal advantage that 
resource revenues provide, foster consumption linkages and at the same time overwhelms 
the productive linkages necessary for generating sustainable economies, Karl (1999: 35) 
notes. When the non-natural resource sectors shrink, several disadvantageous effects may 
set in (Røed Larsen 2004: 14): first, know-how, physical plants, and technology may be lost 
irreversibly; second, positive externalities – learning by doing, technological progress, and 
innovative practices – from manufacturing may be lost, and not be replaced by positive 
externalities from resource extraction. Karl (1997) notes that easy access to money definitely 
can weaken traditional work ethics and reduce incentives for entrepreneurship, as well as 
lowering financial discipline within bureaucracies and leading to reckless budgetary 
practices.  
The spending effect (Corden and Neary 1982) results from converting resource 
revenue into domestic currency, and using the currency domestically and thereby increasing 
aggregate demand. This method has two sub-effects. First, the conversion involves an 
increased demand for domestic currency, and second, the increased demand for domestic 
goods and services may lead to excess demand if the economy is at capacity. Both effects 
lead to real appreciation of the domestic currency, which again leads to loss of 
competitiveness and a reduction of the non-oil traded commodity sector (Røed Larsen 2004: 
14).  
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10.1 Norway 
A long-term effect of factor movement is the loss of know-how and entrepreneurship (Røed 
Larsen 2004; Baland and Francois 2000). This is a result of labor and expertise flowing to the 
lucrative resource industry from other types of manufacturing, which further leads to less 
investment in physical plants and research and development in non-resource manufacturing. 
In turn this hurts economic diversification and makes for great reliance on future economic 
output from the resource industry. Oil and gas are non-renewable resources hence one day 
the resource will be depleted. Therefore it is important to maintain a diverse export base 
during resource booms expecting the day the resource can no longer function as the driver 
of the economy. Norwegian policymakers foresaw these dangers in the seventies. Thus they 
provided a strategy of maintaining and accumulating industrial know-how with an emphasis 
on knowledge, technological progress, and human capital (Røed Larsen 2004: 13). Some of 
the policies are presented previously in chapter 9.2.1 global economy, along with today’s 
main government bodies meant to alleviate the dangers of the Dutch disease. The policies 
have in the present, and will presumably in the future, benefit the Norwegian economy by 
not making it overly reliant on one industry with the inherent dangers of volatile oil and gas 
prices and inevitable resource depletion.  
10.1.1 Factor Movement Effect 
In the period between 1960 and 1995 Norway spent all its oil and gas revenue, not unlike 
Alberta today. The earnings were canalized into the national budget, and were spent on 
running expenses, and a large share of the money was spent on expanding the public sector 
(Vale 2007: 457). During the Period between 1971 and 1995 the public sector in Norway 
grew from 17 percent to 30 percent of the total labor force. The industry and mining sector 
declined from 25 percent to 14 percent in the same period, and the primary sector declined 
from 12 percent to 4 percent. The same tendencies can be seen in other countries, however 
the tendencies seem to be stronger in Norway, according to Vale (2007: 457). Agriculture 
and fisheries endured as important elements of the Norwegian economy in the last quarter 
of the twentieth century. However its share of GDP declined from 5.6 to 2.4 percent (Heidar 
2001). The agricultural sector was heavily subsidized by the government to provide equal 
payment for farmers as for industrial workers. This, however, helped only slow the declining 
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number of farmers. In the fishing industry, fish farming supported the export of fish, one of 
the most important export articles of the mainland industries (Bailey 1997: 153).  
Since the seventies the economic importance (contribution to GDP) of traditional 
industries has declined and the importance of the petroleum sector has been on the rise. For 
example during the period from 1975 to 1995, the mining and manufacturing contribution to 
GDP declined from 22 to 13 percent as a consequence of the decreasing number of laborers 
in these industries. This de-industrialization was partly due to technological enhancements 
making the need for labor less demanding, but it was also a side effect of the increased 
significance of petroleum products dealing with investment, exports, and GDP (Heidar 2001: 
101).  
However, less than 1 percent of the total Norwegian labor force is employed by the 
oil and gas industry today122. If services and manufacturing directly connected to the oil and 
gas industry is added to the number about 3 percent of the labor force has work associated 
with oil and gas123. Today the primary sector accounts for about 2.7 percent of the total 
labor force. Manufacturing accounts for 19 percent, health and social services account for 19 
percent, and education for about 9 percent. Retail and services are by far the largest sector 
of the Norwegian economy employing 40 percent of laborers124.  
Table 11 
 
These numbers show that even though Norway receives great revenues from oil and gas 
production, it has managed to maintain a diverse economic base and have thus avoided the 
Dutch disease effect of factor movement to the resource industry.  
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sector retail and manufacturing health and education oil and gas primary
services social services sector
40 % 19 % 19 % 9 % 3 % 2.7%
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Figure 2 
 
Source: Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, found at: http://www.npd.no/en/Publications/Facts/Facts-2011/Chapter-3/   
Figure 2, found in the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate’s annual report: “Facts 2011”125, 
show that even though the oil and gas industry is by far the largest source of income for the 
Norwegian government, other industries contribute substantially as well. This provides a 
picture of successful policies, as presented in the chapter 9.2.1 global economy, aimed at 
reducing the importance of oil and gas on the total economy.  
To limit the dangers of factor movement, in addition to the policies mentioned 
previously, the centralized wage formation system was applied to limit general wage 
increases at the magnitude of productivity increases in the manufacturing sector. By 
reminding the negotiating parts about the effects on the aggregate economy, the Norwegian 
government instigated temperance in wage negotiations. This way overly high wages in the 
economic lucrative oil and gas business was avoided, and in turn this diminished the risk of 
extensive factor movement of labor to the oil and gas industry at the mercy of other 
manufacturing and service sectors. Hence the corporatist institutions, as discussed above, 
arguably explains how Norway managed to avoid the damaging effects of factor movement 
due to large natural resources because it allows government interference in the economy, in 
the ways noted.  
10.1.2 Spending Effect 
According to Vale (2007: 457) economic theory tells us that extensive domestic use of 
natural resource revenue will lead to an appreciating currency, and that this will be 
damaging to national industry, as international competitors will gain an advantage when 
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products produced in Norway become more expensive vis-à-vis products produced 
elsewhere. As mentioned in chapter 5.3.2 Employment, the Norwegian government has full 
employment as one of its stated objectives, and real appreciation would inevitably hurt the 
manufacturing industry as it makes for a tougher export environment and increasing interest 
rates. According to Røed Larsen (2004: 13) Norway avoided the most detrimental effects of 
the Dutch disease through the seventies and eighties. This could have been part luck, part 
policy, but reports from parliament document deliberations in the seventies by Norwegian 
policymakers contemplating the dangers of the Dutch disease, and consequently they made 
preemptive actions (ibid.).  
The preemptive actions the Norwegian government applied to prevent the spending 
effect included fiscal discipline, down payment of debt, and the establishment of an abroad 
petroleum fund (Røed Larsen 2004: 1). If the oil and gas revenue to a larger extent were 
canalized into the Norwegian market it would likely “shock” the economy and overheating 
would be inevitable (Krugman and Wells 2009). The establishment of the government 
owned petroleum fund abroad is therefore of special importance. By severing the economy 
in two keeping the vast oil revenues apart from the general economy excess spending and 
real appreciation is less likely. As noted previously, Bank of Norway is instructed to aim for 
an inflation of 2.5 percent. Excess spending of oil revenue domestically would inevitably 
force Bank of Norway to increase the primary interest rate as a means to slow inflation. 
Therefore, according to Vale (2007) the rational choice is to keep oil revenue separated from 
the general economy. As a compromise, 4 percent of capital gains from the fund’s 
investments are applied to the national budget every year.     
 When looking at the numbers, also presented above, Norway has been successful in 
keeping the inflation rate (CPI) low. During the last 20 years the average CPI number is 2.6 
percent, which is close to the goal of 2.5 percent. Unemployment numbers are also 
comparatively low displaying an average of 2.55 percent between 2005 and 2010, with a 
high of 3.5 percent and a low of 1.7 percent126. These numbers show that Norway has been 
shielded from typical effects of the spending effect of real appreciation and its effects visible 
on inflation and employment indicators. 
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 Statistisk Sentralbyrå (15.08.12): 
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10.2 Alberta 
10.2.1 Factor Movement Effect 
Shiell and Busby (2008) argue that a diversified economy did not exist in Alberta prior to the 
discovery of oil and gas. It was the discovery of these natural resources that stimulated 
growth in manufacturing in downstream and upstream activities in the province. Macdonald 
(2007) notes that the wage increases in resource industries, have led to higher spending on 
goods and services. The result of this is an increase of income growth in sectors such as 
construction, real estate, and leasing. Corden (1984) points to the fact that migrating labor 
goes to both manufacturing and the service sector and this increases the output of the 
economy outside the resource sector. Following this, the activities instigated by the resource 
industry have proved beneficial to other economic sectors.  
Figure 3   
 
 Source: Government of Alberta, found at: https://aeda.alberta.ca/albertaeconomy/Pages/default.aspx  
Shiell and Busby’s (2008), Macdonald’s (2007), and Corden’s (1984) findings contradict the 
idea that large resource revenues remove the economic fundament for a competitive 
diversified economy outside the resource industry. The numbers show that Alberta, after 20 
years of little to no fund saving, sports a highly diversified economy. The non-renewable 
resource industry accounts for about 23.4 percent of provincial GDP. Other important 
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sectors include; finance and real estate 14.6 percent; construction 10.6 percent; business 
and commercial services 9.6 percent; retail and wholesale 9 percent; and manufacturing 6.5 
percent (see Figure 3)127. These numbers show that Alberta, unlike Holland in the sixties, 
have managed to avoid the detrimental economic effects of the Dutch disease without 
utilizing the Norwegian model of severing the economies in two, keeping oil revenues largely 
away from the domestic market.  
However, Alberta sees some signs of an imminent Dutch disease. Wage pressures 
due to manpower shortages have started to resemble the symptoms of the Dutch disease 
(Shiell and Busby 2008: 15). This notion is also backed by Macdonald (2007) who notes that 
the resource boom in Alberta has led to rising resource industry employment while 
manufacturing employment has declined. The numbers show that most sectors have 
experiences an increase in employed laborers on average over last ten years from 2002 until 
2012. Yet manufacturing displays decreasing tendencies128: 
Table 12 
 
The table above displays the percentage of total laborers in Alberta employed in resource 
industries and manufacturing. The empirical numbers support Shiell and Busby (2008) and 
Macdonald’s (2007) claim that decreases in the manufacturing sector combined with 
increases in the resource industry, are resembling warning signs of the Dutch disease. It 
seems like Alberta so far has managed to escape the Dutch disease of factor movement by 
keeping a diverse manufacturing base, yet wage increases and labor movement are warning 
signs of an imminent curse.   
10.2.2 Spending Effect  
When explaining how Alberta so far has managed to avoid the Dutch disease effects of real 
appreciation it is again important to note that Alberta, unlike Norway, is part of a federation. 
As mentioned above, this puts Alberta in a different position concerning currency 
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 Government of Alberta (27.08.12): https://aeda.alberta.ca/albertaeconomy/Pages/default.aspx 
128
 Statistics Canada (23.09.12): http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a26  
resource industry manufacturing
2002 5.8% 8.9%
2012 7.4% 6.7%
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appreciation and primary interest rate, than what is the case for Norway. Ownership and the 
right to handle natural resources is a constitutionally protected right of the provinces, thus 
the decisions of where to allocate oil and gas revenue cannot be dictated from Ottawa. In 
turn this means that it is up to Alberta to decide whether or not to save oil and gas revenue 
in a fund. Addressing the impact of natural resource revenue spending on the Canadian 
currency is not a priority of Albertan provincial politicians today, according to Bimenyimana 
and Vallée (2011). Rather they are concerned with provincial economic growth. The 
manufacturing sector in Alberta is tied to the oil and gas business, cf. Corden (1984); 
Macdonald (2007), hence supporting the oil and gas industry is equal to supporting other 
manufacturing sectors in the province. The Alberta government instigates larger production 
in the oil and gas industry by applying low royalty and tax rates on resource extraction, thus 
the incentive for fund saving is weakened. Instead of fund saving, the province has increased 
spending on infrastructure and other programs to accommodate business, which periodically 
has put pressure on wages and housing prices (Bimenyimana and Vallée 2011).  
During the latest boom years inflation (CPI) in Alberta reached 5 percent, compared 
to a Canadian average of 2.3 percent129. In 2009, however, during the economic downturn 
Alberta CPI was down to -0.1 percent while the Canadian average remained positive at 0.3 
percent130. Yet all in all Alberta’s CPI has averaged well inside Bank of Canada’s inflation goal 
of 1-3 percent at 2.6 percent, between 1990 and 2010131. As it seems, the Alberta economy 
is a boom and bust economy where fluctuating oil and gas prices largely affect the province’s 
economy output. The Alberta government admits the fact that the Alberta economy is 
volatile at the mercy of international market prices on oil and gas in their 2011 economic 
report132. It seems that the Albertans have made a choice of living with the economic 
uncertainty of volatile resource prices by not establishing a return to the fund savings seen 
in the seventies and eighties.  
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In 2003 the world experienced a rise in commodity prices, and this led to a resource 
boom in Canada. Important in this respect is the rise in the price of oil, which peaked in 2007 
with over US$91 per barrel133. A combination of the price increase of oil, and the 
developments of new technologies made, amongst other things, the costly extraction of the 
Alberta oil sands achievable. The increase in oil prices has not come without cost for Canada 
and Alberta, however, and has inevitably led to an appreciation of the Canadian dollar 
toward the American dollar (Macdonald 2007). This corresponds well with the spending 
effect that results from converting resource revenue into domestic currency, and using the 
currency domestically and thereby increasing aggregate demand. Others, Shiell and Busby 
(2008: 15), argue that Alberta is part of a federation and a larger monetary system, and is 
therefore shielded in some ways from the Dutch disease effect of currency appreciation and 
inflation. Yet, this notion is contradicted by Goldberg et al. (2008) who find evidence of 
Dutch disease symptoms despite a common currency across the United States. They suggest 
that exchange effects are unlikely to be the primary mechanism of the Dutch disease, 
underpinned by their cross-national findings. Apparently there are differing views on the 
effect of the “federation” argument when addressing the spending effect. 
Nevertheless, Shiell and Busby (2008) point to labor movement within the federation 
and that this helps moderate wage increases, and contend that historically there is scant 
evidence of an adverse impact on non-resource sectors in Alberta. Vale (2007) argues that 
Norwegian spending of resource revenue cannot be increased due to shortage of labor, thus 
the increased spending would lead to real appreciation. Alberta, being a part of a larger 
federation, could easily instigate labor immigration from the surrounding provinces to 
mitigate this problem, according to Shiell and Busby (2008). The numbers in table 14 show 
net migration to Alberta from other Canadian provinces134: 
Table 13 
 
The numbers show, expectedly, that migration to the province is low during slower 
economic times in the late eighties and late 2000’s. During prosperous times the booming oil 
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 Trading-charts: http://futures.tradingcharts.com/chart/CO/M 
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 Statistics Canada (27.09.12): http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/91-209-x/2011001/article/11514/tbl/tbl-
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and gas sector instigates migration of workers from other provinces in Canada. The average 
migration for the period between 1991 and 2009 is 18 674, however the numbers fluctuate 
vastly with a low of -1 630 in 1993/94 and a high of 45 795 in 2005/06. Of all the Canadian 
provinces only Alberta and British Columbia display positive migration numbers during the 
period between 1991 and 2009135.  Seemingly the other provinces are leaking, and some of 
the people leaving the other provinces end up in Alberta. It thus looks like Shiell and Busby 
(2008) are right, by referring to CPI and migration numbers, when they claim that: when 
economic activity is high in Alberta, labor migration to the lucrative oil and gas business and 
other sectors will help mitigate wage increases.  
The Dutch disease effects are most visibly seen after the resource has been depleted 
(Bimenyimana and Vallée 2011). With the Alberta Department of Energy estimating that the 
oil reserves in the province will last for 170 years, it is hardly surprising that future depletion 
of the resource is not an imminent concern in the province136. However other concerns 
should be addressed. Volatile market prices and technological developments due to 
environmental worries are factors that could make the Alberta oil and gas reserves less 
valuable. As noted above, Alberta is a boom and bust economy dependent on international 
market prices. When prices are high the economy is booming, and opposite, when prices are 
low the economy will struggle. This historical fact has made several economic actors voice an 
argument for saving during boom times, which may be used during bust times. Both the 
Alberta Chambers of Commerce and the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Alberta, as 
previously presented, have pronounced concerns about the volatility of the Albertan 
economy. Their efforts have led to the establishment of a Sustainability Fund meant for 
correctional purposes during economic downturns. Yet this fund may not exceed C$2.5 
billion and during the recent financial downturn the Sustainability Fund was depleted, 
showing that a larger fund is needed in case of a more lasting economic recession. In short, 
Alberta being a province in Canada makes it less susceptible to the Dutch disease although 
some signs of factor movement and spending effect are visible. It seems that the possibility 
to easily instigate migration from other provinces during prosperous times partly explain 
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how Alberta escaped the disease despite high economic output combined with little or no 
fund saving.  
10.3 Summary, Comparison and Findings 
Both Norway and Alberta are today prosperous economies, and the economic policies 
pursued by the two governments (liberal and coordinated) have theoretic backing in Hall 
and Soskice’s (2001) Varieties of Capitalism. Yet when viewed in light of Dutch disease 
theory both cases are mildly susceptible to this phenomenon and Alberta maybe more so, 
than Norway. 
 Since 1970, when oil was discovered in the North Sea, Norway saw a decline in 
industries other than oil when measuring their respective GDP contribution, and the number 
of workers employed in other industries declined. This implies a factor movement away from 
more traditional industries, yet only 3 percent of the total Norwegian labor force is today 
employed by the oil and gas industry. In Alberta this number is 7.4 percent, indicating that 
Norwegian policies meant to strengthen economic diversification have been more successful 
than what is seen in Alberta. Nevertheless oil and gas’ contribution to GDP is more or less 
equal in the two cases (23.4 percent in Alberta and 21 percent in Norway). Seemingly both 
economies have oil and gas as important components of their total economies, even though 
other sectors contribute substantially as well. In Norway the major wage negotiations and 
government schemes for the promotion of Norwegian industries outside the oil and gas 
sector must be expected to be an important reason for this. In Alberta the possibility to 
instigate labor migration from surrounding provinces has helped mitigate the effect of factor 
movement because migrating labor goes to industries also outside the oil and gas sector. 
The migrating labor additionally helps mitigate the spending effect in Alberta, while the 
government savings fund functions as a safeguard against this phenomenon in Norway, in 
the ways noted in previously.    
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11 Validity of Findings 
11.1 Universality 
According to Rueschemeyer (2003: 332) comparative historical analysis falls short of 
developing “universally applicable social theory whose propositions are substantively 
meaningful and hold under specified conditions independent of time and place”. Hence the 
analysis of this paper that relies on empirics gathered from Alberta and Norway and seen in 
light of theory presented above, have low external validity. The political culture and political 
institutional structure of the two cases have developed over time within two different 
jurisdictions, and presumably, they may only be utilized as explanatory variables in the two 
cases at hand, as presented. Yet Skocpol and Somers (1980) argue that one of the central 
goals of comparative studies is a type of comparison that examines two cases in order to 
highlight how different they are. Thereby it is possible to interpret how processes of change 
are played out in different ways within each context. In accordance with this, the analysis 
above describes two different political cultural contexts and two different political 
institutional structures and thereafter sees them in light of empirical evidence, with the aim 
of showing why they lead to different outcomes on the dependent variable.  
11.2 Case-Stretching 
Sartori (1984) argues that concepts that may easily be applied to fit a wide range of cases 
often are too broad in definition. The consequence of this is that similarities and contrasts 
among the cases which are important building blocks for the explanation of the outcome, 
are lost in the process. Thus the low number of cases, and the application of system-specific 
indicators in the study, mitigates the chances of case stretching. Accordingly, this paper 
utilizes definitions of political culture and political institutional structure that are solely 
applicable to Alberta and Norway. This way pertinent similarities and differences are 
accounted for, yet the universal applicability of the concepts is more or less absent. This 
approach is also supported by Przeworski and Theune (1970). They contend that the 
achievement of a high level of generality is the basic goal of social science, yet with regard to 
problems of validity: indicators that serve to operationalize the same concept in separate 
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ways in different contexts may be preferable. System-specific indicators that this paper 
utilizes necessitate a close examination of each case, which may not be viable in a large-N 
study. Historical numbers and experiences are seen in light of the political cultural and 
political institutional structural differences in Alberta and Norway. This way the effects of 
western alienation and neo-pluralism in Alberta, and egalitarian individualism and 
democratic corporatism in Norway are shown to lead to different policy outcomes, in 
accordance with Przeworski and Theune.  
11.3 Overdetermination 
It must be noted that the danger of overdetermination cannot be alleviated completely. 
Lijphart (1971) notes that too many variables combined with too few cases could lead to 
overdetermination, meaning that important explanatory variables have been left out 
wrongfully. To mitigate this problem and in accordance with Lijphart, this paper compares 
two similar cases, referring to the independent variables presented previously, and focuses 
the analysis on the acclaimed important explanatory variables political culture and political 
institutional structure. This allows an adequate analysis of their influence on the outcome of 
government fund saving or not. Grounded in the theory and empirics presented above, this 
paper argues that political culture and political institutional structure are two important 
variables explaining the perceived differences.   
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12 Conclusions 
The thesis started out with a puzzling observation. Norway and Alberta share a lot in 
common related to economic prosperity and both have access to vast natural resources and 
are liberal democracies situated in the western hemisphere. Presumably the large reserves 
of oil and gas affect the two economies in positive ways, yet the two have chosen quite 
different paths concerning where the revenue derived from oil and gas production is 
allocated. Norway saves almost all of the revenue in a government owned savings fund, 
while Alberta has since 1987 opted not to save substantial amounts of oil and gas revenue 
for future expenses. Instead Alberta keeps rents on oil and gas production low and thus 
leaves a greater share of revenues to be handled directly by the market. Out of this a 
research question was formulated: 
Why have the government of Norway and the provincial government of Alberta ended up 
with different policies for natural resource revenue allocation? 
Obviously differences in jurisdictional autonomy must be expected to have an effect in this 
regard. Norway is a sovereign country with its own currency and central bank, while Alberta 
is a province in the Canadian federation with limited autonomy. Nevertheless both cases 
keep ownership rights to most of the natural resources found on their territories and both 
have responsibility for the provision of public services like education, health care, and 
infrastructure.  
In the chapter 7 Jurisdictional Autonomy it was argued that even though Norway is a 
sovereign state it is influenced by wide reaching economic policies made outside their 
jurisdiction. In this regard Norway resembles Alberta that is also influenced by exogenously 
made decisions by being a part of the Canadian federation. Further Norwegian policymakers 
have to take considerations toward the developments of the national currency when 
determining economic policy. However numbers show that spending of natural resource 
revenue in Alberta affects the value of the Canadian dollar. Thus this predicament should 
also be on the priority list of policymakers in Alberta. This shows that the economic 
considerations that have to be taken toward resource revenue spending are somewhat 
similar for both Norway and Alberta.  
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In the search for an answer to why the policies differ in the two cases, political 
culture and political institutional structure were employed as explanatory variables.  The two 
cases form a good foundation for utilization of the most similar case method of comparison 
because they are similar on a range of independent variables, but differ on the dependent 
variable. They also differ on the two variables political culture and political institutional 
structure that this thesis argues explain the different outcomes. Political culture is a difficult 
variable to employ with regard causality. Yet by employing Wildavsky’s (1987) definition of 
culture as something that shapes what people want it is possible to distinguish it from other 
variables, and thereafter argue that it has causal property. As presented in this thesis it 
becomes clear that Alberta and Norway differ substantially on the political culture variable. 
Alberta is defined by the concept of western alienation that presumes government distrust, 
and a strong belief in the right to free enterprise. Empirics found in history, public surveys 
and the ruling PC government’s policies underline the notion. Norway is described by 
Egalitarian Individualism that makes for a relatively high degree of government interference 
in the economy. Also here history, surveys, and Labor Party policies back the notions 
inherent in the political culture. Apparently the cultural traits presented are fitting for both 
policymakers and the general public. Obviously the wish for free enterprise in Alberta leads 
to low government interference in the economy, and thereby the incentives for government 
extraction of oil and gas rents and subsequently a government facilitated savings fund, are 
largely absent. In Norway the wish for equality and unity leads to a higher degree of 
government interference, and this paves the way for high rents on oil and gas production 
and succeeding government fund saving.  
Political institutional structure is also expected to have an effect on the choice of 
government fund saving or not. Pye (1968) notes that it is not a straightforward task to 
distinguish culture from structure, but maintains that both should be accounted for in 
political analysis. In this thesis political institutional structure is defined as the formal 
institutions descriptive for the relationship between economic actors and between 
economic actors and the government. Following the critical realist position it is possible to 
prescribe causal property to structure because it provides a framework where policymakers 
and other economic actors make their decisions within. This thesis employed democratic 
corporatism as descriptive of the relationship between economic actors and the government 
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in Norway. It entails a rather substantive government intrusion in the economy by the 
facilitation of major wage negotiations and government schemes meant to provide 
protection against international pressure. The argument is that a government owned oil and 
gas fund is a prerequisite for the upholding of the institutions, because it takes away large 
amounts of revenue from wage negotiations and it provides a powerful means to counter 
possibly negative effects on the domestic economy due to external economic pressures. The 
political institutional structure in Alberta was described by the notion of neo-pluralism. Here 
business is situated in a favorable position above other interest groups, and this explains the 
comparatively low rents on oil and gas production. Naturally the low rents produce weak 
incentives for government enabled fund saving. The rents, which are a prerequisite for fund 
saving, are left in the hands of business because the accommodation of business interest is 
seen as the best option by policymakers to instigate economic prosperity. Thus the structure 
turns out to diminish the outlooks for substantial government fund saving.  
Although the two jurisdictions differ on the matter at hand, they have both produced 
prosperous economies. To explain this Hall and Soskice’s Varieties of Capitalism was applied. 
Their approach argues that the options chosen in Norway and Alberta are economically 
rational, due to the differences in political culture and political institutional structure, and 
the positive macroeconomic numbers presented underlines this notion.  
The second research question was: 
Why, or in what degree, have Alberta and Norway escaped the resource curse and the Dutch 
disease? 
Resource curse and Dutch disease theory was applied to add an economic rationale to the 
first research question. Even though both cases have so far fared economically well with 
their different approaches to natural resource fund saving, resource curse and Dutch disease 
factors tell a different story. From the evidence presented it seems clear that Norway have 
done better than Alberta in avoiding these phenomena, and that this is largely due to 
government fund saving. In Norway the government owned oil and gas fund takes away 
large revenues from wage negotiations and thus diminishes the possibility for conflicts. The 
fund also mitigates the chances for political purchase of power. In Alberta a high number of 
work stoppages have also been avoided despite the lack of an operational savings fund. 
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Arguably this is due to coherence between economic actors’ interests and policy in the 
province. Sentiments of clientelism are visible, though, as regulations concerning where oil 
and gas revenues are to be located are largely absent.   
Dutch disease theory concerning factor movement and the spending effect differ, 
although not substantially, in the two cases. Norway experienced factor movement away 
from traditional industries and the primary sector prior to the establishment of the 
government savings fund. Yet today only 3 percent of workers are employed directly by the 
oil and gas industry. In Alberta 7.4 percent is employed by the resource industry. When seen 
in light of decreasing numbers in manufacturing, it seems like Alberta experience factor 
movement to the lucrative oil and gas industry in a higher degree than what is seen in 
Norway. Arguably the differences are due to levels of rent and fund saving or not. When 
rents are high, as in Norway, less revenue is left in the market to be divided between actors. 
Thus wages will be comparatively lower, and this makes it less beneficial for workers to 
move from other industries to the oil and gas sector. The occurrence of the spending effect 
of real appreciation is lessened in Norway due primarily to the government savings fund. By 
storing excess revenue in a fund invested abroad overheating of the economy is less likely. In 
Alberta some signs of real appreciation are visible due to high productivity and low rents. Yet 
the possibility of Alberta to easily instigate labor migration from surrounding provinces 
mitigates this effect, thus the increasing labor force alleviates excess demand.     
96 
 
 
97 
 
References 
 
Almond, G. & S. Verba (1989) The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five 
 Nations. Newbury Park: Sage Publications Inc. 
 
Andreß, H. J. & T. Heinen (2001) “Four Worlds of Welfare State Attitudes? A Comparison 
 of Germany, Norway, and the United States”. European Sociological Review, 17(4). 
 
Andersen, S. S. (1993) The Struggle over North Sea Oil and Gas. Oslo: Scandinavian
 University Press. 
 
Apter, D. E. (1971) Choice and the Politics of Allocation. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Bailey, J. L. (1997) “Norsk fiskeripolitikk” in T. L. Knutsen, G. Sørbø, S. Gjerdåker (ed.) Norges
  Utenrikspolitikk. Oslo: Cappelen. 
 
Baland, J. -M. & P. Francois (2000) “Rent-seeking and Resource Booms” Journal of 
 Development Economics, 61. 
 
Barro, R. J. & V. Grilli (1994) European Macroeconomics. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
 
Bell, E., H. Jansen & L. Young (2007) “Sustaining a Dynasty in Alberta: The 2004 Provincial 
 Election” Canadian Political Science Review, Vol. 1(2) 
 
Berger, S. (1981) Organizing Interests in Western Europe: Pluralism, Corporatism, and the 
 Transformation of Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   
 
Berman, S. (2001) “Review: Ideas, Norms, and Culture in Political Analysis” Comparative
 Politics, 33(2). 
 
Bimenyimana, C. & L. Vallée (2011) “Curing the Dutch Disease in Canada” Policy Options.
 November issue. 
 
Boadway, R. (2007) “Fiscal equalization: the Canadian experience” in N. Bosch & J. M. Durán
 (Ed.) Fiscal Federalism and Political Decentralization Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
 Publishing Limited.  
 
Boase, J. P. (1995) “Federalism and Federal-Provincial Relations” in R. M. Krause & R. H. 
 Wagenberg (Ed.) Introductory Readings in Canadian Government & Politics. Toronto: 
 Copp Clark Ltd.    
98 
 
 
Castles, F. G. (1982) “Introduction: Politics and Public Policy”. In F. G. Castles (Ed.) The 
 Impact of Parties: Politics and Policies in Democratic Capitalist States. London: Sage
 Publications Ltd. 
 
Christensen, T. (2003) “Narratives of Norwegian Governance: Elaborating the Strong State
 Tradition” Public Administration, 81(1). 
 
Christensen, T. (2007) “The Norwegian State Transformed?” in Ø. Østerud (Ed.) Norway in
 Transition – Transforming a Stable Democracy. Oxon: Routledge.  
 
Corden, W. M. & J. P. Neary (1982) “Booming Sector and De-industrialization in a Small Open
 Economy”. Economic Journal, 92. 
 
Corden, W. M. (1984) “Booming Sector and Dutch Disease Economics: Survey and
 Consolidation” Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 36, No. 3 
 
Culpepper, P. D. (2001) “Employers, Public Policy, and the Politics of Decentralized 
 Cooperation in Germany and France” in P. A. Hall, D. Soskice (ed.) Varieties of 
 Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   
 
Dacks, G. (1986) "From consensus to competition: Social democracy and political culture in
 Alberta" in L. Pratt (ed.) Socialism and Democracy in Alberta. Essays in Honour of 
 Grant Notley. Edmonton: NeWest. 
 
Dion, D. (1998) “Evidence and Inference in the Comparative Case Study” Comparative 
 Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2. 
 
Dunleavy, P. & D. O’Leary(1987) Theories of the State: The Politics of Liberal Democracy.
 Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
 
Easton, D. (1990) The Analysis of Political Structure. New York: Routledge. 
 
Eckstein, H. (1966) Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of Norway. Princeton:
 Princeton University Press. 
 
Eichengreen, B. (1996) “Institutions and Economic Growth: Europe after World War II” in N.
  Crafts & G. Toniolo (ed.) Economic Growth in Europe Since 1945. Cambridge: 
  Cambrigde University Press. 
 
99 
 
Eriksen, T. H. (1993) “Being Norwegian in a Shrinking World.” in A. C. Kiel (Ed.), Continuity
  and Change: Aspects of Contemporary Norway. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press. 
 
Esping-Andersen, G. (1985) Politics Against Markets. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
George, A. L. & A. Bennett (2005) Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social
 Sciences. Cambridge: BCSIA. 
 
Gibbins, R. (1979) “Western Alienation and the Alberta Political Culture” in C. Caldarola (Ed.)
 Society and Politics in Alberta. Toronto: Methuen Publications. 
 
Gibbins, R. (1980) Prarie Politics and Society: Regionalism in Decline. Toronto: Butterworth
 and Company Ltd. Canada. 
 
Gilsdorf, R. R. (1979) “Western Alienation, Political Alienation, and the Federal System:
 Subjective Perceptions” in C. Caldarola (Ed.) Society and Politics in Alberta. Toronto:
 Methuen Publications. 
 
Goldberg, E., E. Wibbels, & E. Mvukiyehe(2008) “Lessons from Strange Cases: Democracy,
  Development, and the Resource Curse in the U.S. States”. Comparative Political
  Studies. 41: 477. 
 
Goldthorpe, J. H. (1984) Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism. New York: Oxford
  University Press. 
 
Guldbrandsen, T., F. Engelstad, T. B. Klausen, H. Skjeie, M. Teigen & Ø. Østerud (2002)
 Norske makteliter. Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk Forlag. 
 
Gullestad, M. (1992) The art of social relations: Essays on culture, social action and everyday
  life in modern Norway Oslo: Scandinavian University Press. 
 
Gylfason, T. (2001) “Nature, Power, and Growth” Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 48: 5. 
 
Hall, P. A. & D. Soskice (2001) Varieties of Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Heidar, K. (2001) Norway – Elites on Trial. Boulder. Colorado: Westview Press. 
 
Hveem, H. (1994) Internasjonalisering og politikk – Norsk utenriksøkonomi i et
 utviklingsperspektiv. Oslo: Tano. 
 
100 
 
Ingebritsen, C. (2010) “Katzenstein’s legacy 25 years after: small states in world markets”
 European political science Nr. 9. 
 
Jackson, R. J., D. Jackson & N. Baxter-Moore, (1986) Politics in Canada: Culture, Institutions,
 Behaviour, and Public Policy. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada.  
 
Karl, T. L. (1997) The Paradox of Plenty. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Karl, T. L. (1999) “The Perils of the Petro-State: Reflections on the Paradox of Plenty”.
 Journal of International Affairs, Fall 1999, 53, No. 1. 
 
Katzenstein, P. J. (1985) Small States in World Markets – Industrial Policy in Europe. New 
 York: Cornell University Press. 
 
Keohane, R. O. (1984) “The World Political Economy and the Crisis of Embedded Liberalism”
 in J. H. Goldthorpe (ed.) Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism. Oxford:
 Clarendon Press. 
 
Kohli, A. (1995) “The role of Theory in Comparative Politics: A Symposium” World Politics,
  Vol. 48, No. 1. 
 
Krugman, P. & R. Wells (2009) Economics. New York: Worth Publishers. 
 
Lawson, R. J. (2005) “Understanding Alienation in Western Canada: Is “Western Alienation”
 the Problem? Is Senate Reform the Cure?” Journal of Canadian Studies, 39(2). 
 
Lehman, E. W. (1972) “On the Concept of Political Culture: A Theoretical Reassessment”.
 Social Forces, 50(3). 
 
Lehmbruch, G. (1984) “Concertation and the Structure of Corporatist Networks” in 
 J. H. Goldthorpe (ed.) Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism. Oxford:
 Clarendon Press. 
 
Lewis, P. A. (2002) “Agency, Structure and Causality in Political Science: A Comment on
 Sibeon” Politics, Vol. 22(1). 
 
Lijphart, A. (1971) “Comparative Politics and Comparative Method” American Political
 Science Review, 65. 
 
Lijphart, A. (1975) “II. The Comparable-Case Strategy in Comparative Research” Comparative
  Political Studies. 8: 158. 
101 
 
 
Lijphart, A. (1999) Patterns of Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Lind, T. & G. A. Mackay (1980) Norwegian Oil Policies. London: C. Hurst & Co. Ltd. 
 
Lindblom, C. E. (1977) Politics and Markets. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Lindblom, C. E. (1982) “The Market as Prison” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 44. 
 
Listhaug, O. & M. Wiberg. (1995) “Confidence in Political and Private Institutions” in H.-D.
 Fusch & D. Fusch (Ed.) Citizens and the State. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Listhaug, O. (2007) “Oil Wealth Dissatisfaction and Political Trust in Norway: A Resource 
 Curse?” in Ø. Østerud (Ed.) Norway in Transition - Transforming a Stable Democracy
 Oxon: Routledge.   
 
Macdonald, R. (2007) “Not Dutch Disease, It’s China Syndrome” Insights on the Canadian
  Economy. Catalogue no. 11-624-MIE – No. 017. 
 
Mankiw, G. N. (2002) Macroeconomics. New York: Worth Publishers. 
 
Mill, J. S. (1843/1970) A System of Logic. London: Longman. 
 
Narud, H. M. & B. Aardal (2007) “Økonomisk stemmegivning i oljefondets skygge” in B. 
Aardal (Ed.) Norske velgere – en studie av stortingsvalget 2005. Oslo: Damm. 
 
Nikiforuk, A. (2008) Tar Sands - Dirty Oil and the Future of a Continent. Vancouver: 
 Greystone Books. 
 
Nordby, T. (1993) Arbeiderpartiet og planstyre 1945-1965. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.  
 
Nordby, T. (2004) “Patterns of Corporatist Intermediation” in Heidar, K. Nordic Politics
 Comparative Perspectives. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. 
 
Norman, D. (1972) “Regional and Provincial Political Cultures” in D. C. Rowat (Ed.) Provincial 
Government and Politics: Comparative Essays. Ottawa: Department of Political 
Science - Carleton University. 
 
Opstad, L. (2010) Innføring i makroøkonomi for økonomiske og administrative studier.  Oslo: 
Cappelen akademisk forlag.    
 
102 
 
Pickup, M., A. Sayers, R. Knopff, & K. Archer. (2004) “Social Capital and Civic 
 Community in Alberta.” Canadian Journal of Political Science, 37(3). 
 
Przeworski, A. & H. Teune (1970) The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. New York: John 
 Wiley. 
 
Pye, L. W. (1968) “Political Culture” in D. L. Sills (Ed.) International Encyclopedia of the Social
 Sciences Vol. 12. London and New York: The Macmillan Company & the Free Press.  
 
Reshef, Y. (1990) “Union Decline: A View from Canada” Journal of Labor Research. Vol. XI,
 Nr. 1. 
 
Rueschemeyer, D. (2003) “Ch. 9: Can One or a Few Cases Yield Theoretical Gains” in J.
 Mahoney & D. Rueschemeyer (Ed.) Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social
 Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Rommetvedt, H. (2002) Politikkens Allmenngjøring og den ny-pluralistiske
 parlamentarismen. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget. 
 
Rommetvedt, H. (2003) The Rise of the Norwegian Parliament. London: Frank Cass.  
 
Rommetvedt, H. (2007) “Norway: Resources Count, But Votes Decide? From Neo-corporatist
 Representation to Neo-pluralist Parliamentarism” in Ø. Østerud (Ed.) Norway in
 Transition – Transforming a Stable Democracy. Oxon: Routledge.  
 
Røed Larsen, E. (2004) “Escaping the Resource Curse and the Dutch Disease? When and Why
  Norway Caught up with and Forged ahead of Its Neighbors.” Discussion Papers No.
  377, May 2004, Statistics Norway, Research Department.  
 
Sartori, G. (1984) (Ed.) Social Science Concepts: A Systematic Analysis. Beverly Hills: Sage. 
 
Schmitter, P. C. (1979) “Still the Century of Corporatism?” in P. C. Schmitter & G.
 Lehmbruch (Ed.) Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation. London: Sage.  
 
Schwartz, H. M. (1994) States versus Markets. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
 
Shaxson, N. (2007) “Oil, Corruption, and the Resource curse”. International Affairs 83: 6. 
 
Shiell, L. & C. Busby (2008) “Resource Revenues and Fiscal Sustainability in Alberta”.
 Working Paper. Ottawa: University of Ottawa, Department of Economics. Found at: 
 http://www.sciencessociales.uottawa.ca/eco/eng/documents/0807.pdf 
103 
 
 
Sibeon, R. (1999) “Agency, Structure, and Social Chance as Cross-Disciplinary Concepts”
 Politics 19(3) 
 
Simeon, R. & D. J. Elkins. (1974) “Regional Political Cultures in Canada.” Canadian
 Journal of Political Science, 7(3). 
 
Skocpol, T. & M. Somers (1980) “The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry”
 Comparative Studies in Society and History 22. 
 
Smith, B. (2004) “Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960-1999” 
 American Journal of Political Science, 48. 
 
Smith, E. (2009) Konstitusjonelt demokrati. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget. 
 
Smith, M. J. (1990) “Pluralism, Reformed Pluralism and Neopluralism: the Role of Pressure
 Groups in Policy-Making” Political Studies. Blackwell Publishing Ltd.  
 
Stephens, J. D. (1979) The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism. London: Macmillan. 
 
Stewart, D. K. & K. Archer (2000) Quasi-democracy? :parties and leadership selection in 
 Alberta. Vancouver: UBC Press. 
 
Stevens, P. (2003) “Resource Impact – Curse or Blessing”. CEPMLP Online Journal V. 
 
Tsalik, S. (2003) Caspian Oil Windfalls: Who Will Benefit? Open Society Institute, Central
 Eurasia Project. PDF at: http://commdev.org/files/1847_file_full_report.pdf 
 
Tsui, K. K. (2005) “More Oil, Less Democracy?: Theory and Evidence from Crude Oil 
 Discoveries” University of Chicago;  Job Market Paper. 
 
Vale, P. H. (2007) Makroøkonomi: har vi kontroll med utviklingen? Oslo: Abstrakt Forlag. 
 
Verba, S. (1965) “Conclusion: Comparative Political Culture” in L. W. Pye & S. Verba (Ed.)
 Political Culture and Political Development. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
 University Press. 
 
Wildavsky, A. (1987) “Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory
 of Preference Formation” American Political Science Review. Vol. 81 No. 1. 
 
Østerud, Ø. (2007a) Statsvitenskap – Innføring i politisk analyse. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. 
104 
 
 
Østerud, Ø. (2007b) “Introduction: The Peculiarities of Norway” in Ø. Østerud (Ed.) Norway
 in Transition -  Transforming a Stable Democracy. Oxon: Routledge.   
 
